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NOTES
LEGAL LIMITATIONS ON MIRANDA
INTRODUCTION*
O NE may note, either with alarm or satisfaction, that the Supreme
Court has, in recent years, displayed increasing concern for
protecting and expanding the constitutional rights of persons sus-
pected of crime. One of the more controversial decisions reflecting
this concern is Miranda v. Arizona,' which is designed to regulate
the interplay between the police and the accused in those situations
in which the police seek admissions or confessions. A majority of the
Court having become disenchanted with the voluntariness test for
determining the admissibility of confessions,' the Miranda opinion
contains a carefully delineated set of prophylactic rules for dealing
with future confessions.' In moving beyond the factual situations
*This note was at press prior to the enactment of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 197, title II, § 701 of which in effect overrules
Miranda in the federal courts.
1384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda was only one of four cases consolidated in the deci-
sion. The other cases involved were Vignera v. New York, Westover v. United
States, and California v. Stewart.
2The voluntariness test was derived from the common law rule that a confession
must be trustworthy before it can be admitted into evidence, and was given consti-
tutional status by the Supreme Court. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287
(1936). The determination of voluntariness was a subjective process, involving a
weighing of the circumstances of pressure against the defendant's power of resist-
ance, to determine whether his will was overborne. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S.
156, 185 (1953). For a discussion of the factors considered under this "totality of
the circumstances" test, see Miller and Kessel, The Confession Confusion, 49 MARQ.
L. REV. 715 (1966) ; Ritz, Twenty-five Years of State Criminal Confession Cases in
the U.S. Supreme Court, 19 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 35, 202 (1962); Comment, The
Coerced Confession Cases in Search of a Rationale, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 313 (1964).
For other developments in the area of confessions prior to Miranda, see Enker &
Elsen, Counsel For the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escohedo v. Illinois,
49 MINN. L. REV. 47 (1964) ; Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in Criminal
Detection, Detention and Trial. 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 657 (1966). See also MODEL
CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966).
3Miranda is not retroactive. In Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), the
Court said its new confession rules apply only to trials which began after June 13,
1966, the date of the Miranda decision. The Court did state that the state courts
were free to apply Miranda to a broader range of cases. Id. at 733. In spite of the
Court's generosity, no state has felt compelled to deviate from Johnson, and only a
few courts considered the problem of retroactivity in any detail. For opinions con-
taining a spirited discussion of the issue, see People v. Rollins, 423 P.2d 221, 56
Cal. Rptr. 293 (1967); State v. Rye, 148 N.W.2d 632 (Iowa 1967); People v.
McQueen, 18 N.Y.2d 337, 221 N.E.2d 550, 274 N.Y.S.2d 886 (Ct. App. 1966).
Most courts simply stated that Miranda was not to be applied retroactively, citing
lohnson as authority. Perhaps the meek obedience of the state courts is summed up
y the words of one judge who stated:
I confess to occasional difficulty in conforming my own views with those
of the Supreme Court, in this area of the law; and now that I have found
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before it, the Court promised to exclude from evidence all confes-
sions or admissions unless, prior to custodial interrogation, the ac-
cused is advised of his fifth and sixth amendment rights and ade-
quately waives them.
Despite its black-letter style, Miranda has proved to be only a
skeletal framework within which the courts must exercise their own
discretion as to how the issues should be resolved.' In resolving
subsequent factual situations, the various state and federal courts
have been far from harmonious in their opinions as to how Miranda
should be interpreted. The purpose of this Note is to discuss and
analyze the major issues arising from Miranda and the possible
legal limitations which may be placed thereon as the courts strive
to obtain a proper balance between the rights of the individual and
the public. Included for discussion are the broad issues of custodial
interrogation, advisement, and waiver.
Although these are probably the most important of the issues
raised by Miranda, they by no means circumscribe the areas covered
by Miranda. Other areas relevant to a Miranda situation have, due
to space limitations, been omitted. However, it is felt desirable here
to identify some of these issues as they are all potential limitations
on the scope and effect of Miranda. One such area is the applica-
tion of the so-called "fruits" doctrine to the Miranda situation. Is
evidence derived from information obtained during an illegal interro-
gation admissible into evidence, or is it the fruits of illegality, and
a decision of that tribunal to which I can easily accommodate, I am unwill-
ing to take a contrary position.
People v. McQueen, 18 N.Y.2d 337, 348, 221 N.E.2d 550, 555, 274 N.Y.S.2d 886,
894 (Ct. App. 1966) (concurring opinion).
In spite of the unanimous feeling that Miranda is not to be given retroactive applica-
tion, the majority of the courts, both state and federal, have held that if the defend-
ant can obtain a reversal of his original conviction, even if on a technicality, he will
have the benefit of Miranda at the retrial, even though it was not available to him
on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Brock, 101 Ariz. 168, 416 P.2d 601 (1966) ; People
v. Doherty, 429 P.2d 177, 59 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1967) ; Creech v. Commonwealth, 412
SW.2d 245 (Ky. 1967) ; People v. Vignera, 18 N.Y.2d 723, 220 N.E.2d 801, 274
N.Y.S.2d 161 (Ct. App. 1966) ; State v. Gray, 268 N.C. 69, 150 S.E.2d 1 (1966) ;
State v. Shoffner, 31 Wis. 2d 412, 143 N.W.2d 458 (1966). Federal cases include
Gibson v. United States, 363 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1966) ; United States v. Pinto, 259
F. Supp. 729 (D.N.J. 1966). On the other hand, a few courts see no difference
between a trial and retrial insofar as application of Miranda is concerned. See
Jenkins v. State, 230 A.2d 262 (Del. 1967) ; People v. Worley, 35 Ill. 2d 574, 221
N.E.2d 267 (1966) ; State v. Vigliano, 47 N.J. 504, 221 A.2d 733 (1966) ; People
v. La Belle, 53 Misc. 2d 111, 277 N.Y.S.2d 847 (Rensselaer County Ct. 1967). See
also Comment, The Applicability of Miranda to Retrials, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 316
(1967). For a searching analysis of the Constitution as a chronological limitation,
see Loewy, The Old Order Changeth -But For Whom?, 1 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1
(1967).
4As Justice Harlan said, "the fine points of this scheme are far less clear than the
Court admits." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 505 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
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thus inadmissible?' May evidence, inadmissible as direct evidence
of guilt because of noncompliance with Miranda, be admitted into
evidence on a question other than guilt? The main concern would
be whether such evidence could be used to impeach the defendant's
credibility.6 Another issue, one of remedy, is, in what tribunals and
at what type of hearing may the defendant raise a Miranda objec-
tion?' Also, does the "standing" rule apply to Miranda violations?
That is, if evidence is obtained from A in violation of A's Miranda
right, does B have a right to object to its admission in a prosecution
against B?'
5 In Miranda, near the close of the opinion, the Court said: "But unless and until
such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence
obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him." 384 U.S. at 479
(emphasis added). See id. at 500 (Clark, J., dissenting opinion).
By using such broad language, the Court made implicit reference to the "fruits" or"primary taint" doctrine, first expressed in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920): "The essence of a provision forbidding the acqui-
sition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not
be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all." The "fruits" doctrine
extends to all evidence, whether it be direct or indirect products of the illegality, or
whether it is verbal statements or more tangible evidence. Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-86 '(1963). See Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A
Study in Faith and Hope, 42 NEB. L. REv. 483, 519-32 (1963).
Subsequent to Miranda, the "fruits" doctrine has been applied in a number of inter-
rogation cases to exclude the evidence obtained. United States v. Harrison, 265 F.
Supp. 660, 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (policy slips); People v. Dannic, 52 Misc. 2d
1012, 277 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (testimony of witnesses excluded because
identity learned through illegal interrogation) ; People v. Glover, 52 Misc. 2d 520,
526, 276 N.Y.S.2d 461, 468 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (dictum) (marijuana); People v.
Reason, 52 Misc. 2d 425, 276 N.Y.S.2d 196 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (stolen goods); cf.
United States v. Davis, 265 F. Supp. 358 '(W.D. Pa. 1967) (illegally obtained state-
ments not part of reasonable cause to search); People v. Spencer, 424 P.2d 715,
57 Cal. Rptr. 163 (1967) (judicial confession excluded because of prior improper
admission of extra-judicial confession). Contra, Brown v. United States, 375 F.2d
310 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See generally George, The Fruits of Miranda: Scope of the
Exclusionary Rule, 39 U. COLO. L. REV. 478 (1967); Jones Fruit of the Poisonous
Tree, 9 So. TEx. L.J. 17 (1967) ; Note, Fruits of the Illegally Ohtained Confession,
4 WILLAME'rrE L.J. 269 (1966).
6 In addition to the impeachment issue, Mr. Justice White has listed other indirect
uses of such evidence, the legality of which has not been settled: to secure an indict-
ment; to convince other witnesses to testify; to support parole revocation; to furnish
guidance at the sentencing stage. 1 BNA QRIM. L. REP. 2281 (1967). The Miranda
opinion, however, does contain a reference to impeachment uses:
In fact, statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are
often used to impeach his testimony at trial or to demonstrate untruths in
the statement given under interrogation and thus to prove guilt by implica-
tion. These statements are incriminating in any meaningful sense of the
word and may not be used without the full warnings and effective waiver
required for any other statement.
384 U.S. at 477.
Most courts have held that the use of inadmissible statements for impeachment
purposes is prohibited by Miranda. State v. Brewton, 422 P.2d 581 (Ore.), cert.
denied, 387 U.S. 943 (1967) ; Gaertner v. State, 35 Wis. 2d 159, 150 N.W.2d 370
'(1967). See 19 S.C.L. REV. 281 (1967).
7 Cf. Note, The Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule in Civil Cases, 43
DENVER L.J. 511 (1966).
8 This issue closely parallels the "standing" requirement in search and seizure cases.
In that area, only California refused to recognize a requirement that only the person
subjected to the unlawful search has the right to object to the use at trial of the
evidence seized. People v. Martin, 45 Cal.2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955). However, in
a recent decision the California Supreme Court reversed its position when dealing
with a Miranda violation. In holding that the "standing" requirement is applicable,
1968
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Another area in which Miranda may have application is that
relating to the police practices of encouragement (or its illegal
counterpart, entrapment) 9 and the use of informants.'0 Will Miranda
the court's justification was that the privilege against self-incrimination is not
violated until the evidence is offered into evidence in a trial of the person from
whom it was taken. However, if the evidence is coerced from a person, the court
indicated that the standing requirement is inapplicable. People v. Varnum, 427 P.2d
772, 775-76, 59 Cal. Rptr. 108, 112 (1967). For a discussion of this case, see
14 How. L.J. 196 (1968).
9 Entrapment has been defined as "the conception and planning of an offense by an
officer, and his procurement of its commission by one who would not have perpe-
trated it except for the trickery, persuasion, or fraud of the officer." Sorrells v.
United States, 287 U.S. 435, 454 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring opinion).
In the past, the Court's treatment of entrapment has been based on statutory con-
struction. Id. at 448-50; Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958). But
see Banks v. United States, 249 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1957). Only recently did the
Court analyze this practice in constitutional jargon. In Lewis v. United States, 385
U.S. 206 (1966), the Court upheld a narcotics conviction, rejecting the contention
that the fourth amendment had been violated. However, the Court cautioned that
each case must be considered on its facts, implying that police deception may at
times be constitutionally offensive. For a discussion of this case. and the constitu-
tional status of "encouragement," see Rotenberg, The Police Detector Practice of
Encouragement: Lewis v. United States and Beyond, 4 HOUSTON L. REV. 609
(1967).
Two main arguments can be advanced against a nexus of the privilege against
self-incrimination and the practice of encouragement. First, it can be argued that no
compulsion is present, and because the fifth amendment requires its presence, it is
not applicable. In discussing the argument, one would have to reassess the Miranda
requirement of custody. Second, the Court distinguishes between communicative and
noncommunicative evidence, holding that the privilege is applicable only as to the
former. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 '(1966). Thus it must be shown that
the evidence obtained from police encouragement is "an accused's communications,
whatever form they might take." Id. at 763-74. It is clear that verbalizations resulting
from encouragement are communicative. However, the physical actions of the defend-
ant may not fit the "communicative" test. In a recent decision, the Court held that
a person's privilege against self-incrimination is not applicable to a police line-up
in which the accused is required to perform acts and utter words for purposes of
identification. In so doing, the Court implied that "communicative" was equivalent
to the disclosure of knowledge. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1967)
(held that defendant had right to counsel during line-up). Accord, Gilbert v. Cali-
fornia, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
At least one court has predicted that Miranda will apply in full force to
"encouragement." People v. Johnson, 52 Misc. 2d 1087, 1091-92, 278 N.Y.S.2d 80,
85 (City Ct. 1967) (dictum). See Note, The Defense of Entrapment. A Plea for
Constitutional Standards, 20 U. FLA. L. REv. 63, 72 (1967). For a detailed discus-
sion of this police practice, see Cowen, The Entrapment Doctrine in the Federal
Courts, and Some State Court Comparisons, 49 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 447 (1959) ;
Orfield, The Defense of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 1967 DUKE L.J. 39
(1967); Williams, The Defense of Entrapment and Related Prohlems in Criminal
Prosecution, 28 FORDHAM L. REV. 399 '(1959); Note, The Serpent Beguiled Me and
I Did Eat - The Constitutional Status of the Entrapment Defense, 74 YALE L.J. 942
(1965); Note, Entrapment, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1333 (1960).
10 If compulsion is a prerequisite to the application of the fifth amendment, then it
would appear that Miranda will not apply to the government's use of a secret
informant to gain evidence. This was the answer supplied by the Supreme Court
in Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303-04 (1966). The fifth amendment was
held not to apply because of the absence of any compulsion, either legal or factual.
In other words, a misplaced confidence that the informer would not reveal the con-
versation is no defense. Cf. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966); Lewis
v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
The Court did say that although "the use of secret informers is not per se uncon-
stitutional" such informer is subject to all relevant constitutional restrictions. 385
U.S. at 311. Thus the Court left itself leeway for future cases in which the facts
might be more shocking. The Court has held that the use of a government informer
in the post-indictment stage may violate the defendant's right to the assistance of
counsel. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
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have any limiting effect on these devices? Miranda may also forbode
that some of the Court's rules in other, nonconfession cases are
subject to revision. For example, in light of the Court's concern, as
expressed in Miranda, for a truly knowledgeable waiver of constitu-
tional rights, will it now require that a person be advised of his right
to refuse a request for a warrantless search, before it will hold that
a person has truly "consented" to the search and thus validated it?"
I. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO THE APPLICATION OF MIRANDA
The threshold inquiry in the discussion of Miranda centers
around a determination of when Miranda applies; that is, at what
point in time is a person's privilege against self-incrimination jeop-
ardized? If it is decided that, in a particular case, Miranda does not
apply, there need be no advisement and an accompanying waiver
for the person has no rights which may be violated. The resolution
of this issue entails a variety of potential limitations on the scope
and effect of Miranda, and will be a breeding ground for consid-
erable litigation in the years to come.
The Supreme Court indicated that a person is entitled to the
Miranda safeguards when he is subjected to "custodial interroga-
tion," defined by the Court as "questioning initiated by law enforce-
ment officers after a person has been taken into custody or other-
wise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."' 2
In a footnote to the sentence the Court added: "This is what we
meant in Escobedo when we spoke of an investigation which had
focused on an accused.' 
1
1
The Court's definition reveals three significant limitations on the
prospective application of Miranda: 1) a person must be in custody
11 Unless a search is conducted pursuant to a search warrant or incidental to a lawful
arrest, the police must obtain the person's consent in order to conduct a search which
will not be vitiated by the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable search
and seizures. Judging from the Court's concern for a knowledgeable and intelligent
waiver of rights, the Miranda rationale may henceforth require that before a consent
search is conducted, the person must be advised: 1) that he has the right to refuse
a warrantless search and no legal stigma will be attached to his refusal to consent;
2) that if he does consent, any seizable evidence which is revealed by the search may
be used in evidence against him. If the person thereafter consents, the search will bh
valid. Some post-Miranda courts have so held. United States v. Nikrasch, 367 F.2d
740, 744 (7th Cir. 1966); United States v. Blalock, 255 F. Supp. 268, 269 (E.D.
Pa. 1966). Contra, Gorman v. United States, 380 F.2d 158, 164 (1st Cir. 1967);
State v. McCarty, 199 Kan. 116, 427 P.2d 616, 619-20 (1967) ; State v. Forney,
181 Neb. 757, 150 N.W.2d 915 (1967); Weeks v. State, 417 S.W.2d 716, 719
(Tex. Crim. App. 1967). For a good discussion, see Note, Consent Searches: A
Reappraisal After Miranda v. Arizona, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 130 (1967). See gen-
erally LaFave, Search and Seizure: "The Course of True Law . . . Has Not ... Run
Smooth," 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 255. The multiple problems involved in proving consent
were discussed in Note, Effective Consent to Search and Seizure, 113 U. PA. L. REV.
260 (1964).




or otherwise effectively detained, 4 and 2) subjected to questioning
3) by law enforcement officers. A fourth limitation which was not
discussed in Miranda is, for what crime must the person be suspected
of committing? Future litigation of the application of Miranda to
a particular fact situation will revolve around these four potential
conditions precedent.
Before discussing these limiting factors and the various alterna-
tives available to the courts within each, it might be profitable to
note some general language used by the Court in discussing the
application of the fifth amendment privilege to pre-trial situations.
Although general statements are never too helpful, they may give
some indication of the direction which the Supreme Court will take
in the years ahead. The privilege "has always been 'as broad as the
mischief against which it seeks to guard.' "15 Further, "our accusa-
tory system of criminal justice demands that the government seeking
to punish an individual produce the evidence against him by its own
independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of
compelling it from his own mouth.''16 The Court also said that the
privilege against self-incrimination "serves to protect persons in all
settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any signifi-
cant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves."17 In
light of the Court's increasing concern for protecting and enhanc-
ing individual rights, and because the privilege "has consistently
been accorded a liberal construction,"' 8 it is clear that the Court will
expand the scope of Miranda when necessary to prevent abuses
resulting from strait-jacketed interpretations.
A. Custody or Effective Detention.
The Supreme Court, realizing that the fifth amendment only
protects a person from being compelled to incriminate himself,'"
required that the person's freedom of movement be curtailed in
some significant way before that person could have the benefit of
Miranda. Thus, custody or effective detention is, for the present,
14 "Effective detention" has been coined to refer to the Court's language: "or other-
wise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 384 U.S. at 444.
15 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 459-60 (1966).
16 Id. at 460.
17 Id. at 467 (emphasis added).
13 Id. at 461.
19 The fifth amendment reads in part: "No person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself. ... U. S. CONST. amend. V.
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a condition precedent to the application of Miranda.20  However,
the precise moment when a person's freedom has been sufficiently
restrained was left largely unresolved by Miranda. The Court did
say that a person is entitled to the benefit of Miranda when he is
deprived of his freedom of movement in a significant way,2' which
is to say that the investigation has focused on him.22 Another indi-
cation of the scope of Miranda is what the Court has deemed to be
permissible investigation to which Miranda does not apply:
Our decision is not intended to hamper the traditional function of
police officers in investigating crime .... When an individual is in
custody on probable cause, the police may, of course, seek out
evidence in the field to be used at trial against him. Such investi-
gation may include inquiry of persons not under restraint. General
on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other
general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process is not
affected by our holding. 23
Awaiting further elucidation from the Supreme Court, state and
lower federal courts must determine for themselves the situations
which can be deemed compelling for purposes of applying Miranda.
The courts are already in hopeless conflict with one another in re-
solving this issue. The presence of a police-dominated atmosphere,
the formalizing of an arrest, the existence of probable cause to arrest
- these and other considerations have emerged as potential limita-
tions on Miranda.
20 It may be questioned whether custody or effective detention is the exclusive indicator
of compulsion. For example, compulsion may be present in "interviews" with persons
suspected of white-collar crimes such as tax fraud, even though the person is
technically free to leave. When a person is being investigated for possible tax evasion,
tax officials will "interview" him. Successful cooperation usually depends upon the
cooperation" of the taxpayer. Thus, the taxpayer's privilege against self-incrimination
is in serious jeopardy, though he may refuse to cooperate. However, the courts usually
have found that this situation does not fall within the Miranda arena, it being
limited to custodial situations. See cases collected in Frohmann v. United States,
380 F.2d 832, 835-36 (8th Cir. 1967). See also United States v. Gower, 271 F.
Supp. 655, 659-61 (M.D. Pa. 1967) (court looked for, and found, stage where
investigation clearly focused on defendant). For a good discussion advocating the
application of Miranda to criminal tax investigations, see Lipton, Constitutional
Rights in Criminal Tax Investigations, 53 A.B.A.J. 517 (1967).
Recently, the Supreme Court handed down its first post-Miranda decision
interpreting Miranda. The facts involved questioning by a revenue agent of a man
in prison serving a sentence for a non-tax crime. The Court held this to be custodial
interrogation warranting the application of Miranda. Though the Court apparently
erased any supposed distinction, for purposes of Miranda, between the IRS classifi-
cations of "civil" and "criminal" investigative stages, the opinion shed little light
on the "custody" issue, as the defendant's presence in prison was obviously custodial.
Mathis v. United States, 88 S.Ct. 1503 (1968).
21 384 U.S. at 444.
22 Id. n.4.
2 384 U.S. at 477. For cases involving general on the scene questioning, see Sciberras
v. United States, 380 F.2d 732 (10th Cir. 1967) ; United States v. Essex, 275 F.Supp.
393 (E.D. Tenn. 1967) ; United States v. Delamarra, 275 F.Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1967)
State v. Phinis, 199 Kan. 472, 430 P.2d 251 (1967).
1968
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1. The Place of Questioning.
A perusal of the post-Miranda cases indicates that the place
where the questioning occurs has emerged as a significant limitation
on the application of Miranda. That is, several courts believe that
the questioning must have been conducted in the station house or in
some other "police-dominated atmosphere."24
The emergence of "place" as a limitation is attributable to
the Miranda opinion, containing a lengthy discussion of the secret
interrogation process which is conducted in an atmosphere which
"carries its own badge of intimidation."2 Because the factual situa-
tions in Miranda involved station-house interrogations, the Court
discussed in detail the various physical and psychological pressures
outlined in the police manuals and texts.26 The Court then con-
cluded that such interrogations were justifiably within the ambit of
the fifth and sixth amendment protections.
It is obvious that interrogations conducted within the confines
of the police station are governed by Miranda, but are these the
only situations in which Miranda is applicable? Practical considera-
tions suggest that Miranda is much broader in scope. The long dis-
cussion of the nature of secret interrogations was undoubtedly to
justify expanding the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination
to include pre-trial situations in which a person may be compelled
to incriminate himself. The Court could best accomplish this by
dramatizing the potential coerciveness in the factual situations be-
fore it. Since ours is a case-by-case system, and because the Court
avoids rendering advisory opinions, it could not be expected that
interrogation practices outside the police station would be discussed.
Nevertheless, the Court, by using language which encompasses far
more than station-house interrogations, has indicated its willingness
to extend the protection of Miranda to a far greater latitude of
situations. A broad interpretation receives further justification from
what the Court perceives as permissible questioning; that is, general
questioning of persons not under restraint.2"
Although the place of interrogation may at times be considered,
the relevant determination should be, at what point in time does a
24 See, e.g., Evans v. United States, 377 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1967) ; United States v.
Littlejohn, 260 F.Supp. 278, 282 (E.D.N.Y. 1966) ; Gaudio v. State, 1 Md. App.
455, 468, 230 A.2d 700, 708 (1967); People v. Gilbert, 8 Mich. App. 393, 154
N.W.2d 800 (1967) ; cf. State v. Norlega, 6 Ariz. App. 428, 433 P.2d 281 (1967).
Also, it is apparent from a recent Supreme Court decision that at least three Justices
would support the limiting of Miranda to these situations. Mathis v. United States,
88 S.Ct. 1503 (1968) (White, Harlan, and Stewart, dissenting).
25 384 U.S. at 457.
2
6 Id. at 448-55.
27 Id. at 477-78.
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person feel "compelled" to answer inquiries? Surely, if a person is
confronted by a police officer who identifies himself, usually by
displaying his badge, and if that person is in fact not free to leave
of his own volition, he may feel compelled to answer questions.
The fact of custody is, by its very nature, compulsive.28 By consider-
ing the place of interrogation controlling, the police would be en-
couraged to circumvent Miranda by conducting all interrogation
outside the police station.
29
2. The Person Under Arrest or Detained on Probable Cause.
If the place of interrogation is not considered controlling, the
next logical limitation is to restrict Miranda to those cases in which
the person was under arrest or in which the evidence gives the police
probable cause to arrest. The only significance of an arrest would
be to show that the person's freedom of action was clearly restrained.
In this context, the lawfulness of the arrest, or whether it was with
or without a warrant, is irrelevant.30 A person detained on reason-
able or probable cause is in the same predicament as one who has
been arrested, and the Miranda safeguards should apply. As con-
cerns the fifth and sixth amendment safeguards, the plight of the
accused is no different than for one under arrest, except that no
verbalizing of "you are under arrest" has taken place.31 Although
there is nothing magical about these words, some courts appear to
worship their existence.32 Thus, some courts have grafted a limita-
tion on Miranda which the Supreme Court never anticipated.
Compulsion, not arrest, triggers the constitutional safeguards
provided in Miranda. Although the two terms may be related, they
are not synonymous. If the Supreme Court had wished to limit
Miranda to arrest situations, it would have been a simple matter to
frame its custody limitation in those words. If interrogation becomes
custodial only after the fact of arrest, the Miranda opinion may well
28 People v. Allen, 50 Misc. 2d 897, 904, 272 N.Y.S.2d 249, 255 (Sup. Ct. 1966),
rei/d, 28 App. Div. 2d 724, 281 N.Y.S.2d 602 (1967). See People v. Glover, 52
Misc. 2d 520, 523, 276 N.Y.S.2d 461, 465 (Sup. Ct 1966). The possibility that,
in fact, a given person may not feel compelled to answer questions should be of little
importance. Miranda is designed to insure that the average person, when confronted
with custodial interrogation, will be able to exercise an intelligent choice. Just as
the Court said, 384 U.S. at 471-72, that it will not inquire in a particular case
whether in fact, a person had previous knowledge of his rights, so also the Court
cannot be expected to consider whether in a given case, the defendant in fact did not
feel compelled.
29People v. Allen, 50 Misc. 2d 897, 901, 272 N.Y.S.2d 249, 253 (Sup. Ct. 1966),
rev'd, 28 App. Div. 2d 724, 281 N.Y.S.2d 602 (1967).
30 It makes no difference to the defendant why or how he was arrested. The fact of
arrest places him in compelling circumstances.
31 True, there will be more compulsion if a person is formally placed under arrest, but
there is sufficient compulsion absent arrest.
32 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 259 F.Supp. 496, 497 (D. Mass. 1966) ; People v.
Nieto, 55 Cal. Rptr. 546, 549 (Ct. App. 1966) (dictum), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 911
(1967). See 18 W. REs. L. REV. 1777 (1967).
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become a verbal exercise in futility because the police need only
delay "arrest" until after interrogation is concluded.
33
Some courts, skirting analysis, have recited that in a particular
case, Miranda does not apply for there was no arrest, merely a
"detention, '"" or an "accosting. ' 35 Duffy v. State 6 is representative
of the cases seemingly substituting semantics for analysis. An officer
saw three persons run from the scene of a robbery, in which the
victim had been stabbed. Two of them, whom the officer recognized,
were later apprehended. From them he gleaned the name of the
third and the officer proceeded to where the defendant was sleep-
ing. The officer observed the knife used in the robbery, for it was
only partially hidden under the mattress. He then roused the de-
fendant, but instead of saying "you are under arrest" he elicited
inculpatory statements in response to his questions. The defendant
was then "arrested." In admitting the statements into evidence, the
court said:
[T]he exclusionary principles enunciated in . . .Miranda ... are
not applicable to a confession gleaned from a suspect who is merely
accosted by the police, but deal instead with the safeguards which
must be provided for an accused who is in police custody.B7
In another case, Miranda was held inapplicable because the de-
fendant was not arrested, merely detained, even though marijuana
had been found on his ship and he was confined thereon. His free-
dom was so severely restricted that when it was necessary for him
to go to the restroom, he had an official escort. The last period of
interrogation was conducted by an official who had an arrest war-
rant in his possession. 8 Other cases with similar situations and hold-
ings include: the stopping of the defendant's car, with probable
cause;3 9 the taking of the defendant to an official's office for ques-
tioning;40 questioning on the street after the officers had probable
cause to arrest the defendant for robbery. 1
33 See State v. Tellez, 6 Ariz. App. 251, 255, 431 P.2d 691, 695 (1967); People v.
Allen, 50 Misc. 2d 897, 901-02, 272 N.Y.S.2d 249, 253 (Sup. Ct. 1966), relid,
28 App. Div. 2d 724, 281 N.Y.S.2d 602 (1967).
34 Brown v. United States, 365 F.2d 976, 979 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ; United States v.
Davis, 259 F. Supp. 496, 497 (D. Mass. 1966) ; People v. Nieto, 55 Cal. Rptr. 546,
549 (Ct. App. 1966) '(dictum), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 911 (1967).
35 Dixon v. State, 1 Md. App. 623, 626, 232 A.2d 538, 540 (1967) ; Duffy v. State,
243 Md. 425, 431, 221 A.2d 653, 656 (1966).
36 243 Md. 425, 221 A.2d 653 (1966).
37 Id. at 431, 221 A.2d at 656.
38 United States v. Davis, 259 F. Supp. 496, 497-98 (D. Mass. 1966).
3 9 United States v. Littlejohn, 260 F.Supp. 278, 282 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
40 United States v. Appell, 259 F. Supp. 156, 157 (D. Mass. 1966).
41 People v. Kenny, 53 Misc. 2d 527, 530, 279 N.Y.S.2d 198, 202 (Sup. Ct. 1966)
(the court found significant the absence of a police dominated atmosphere; accord,
Evans v. United States, 377 F.2d 535, 536 (5th Cir. 1967).
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Other courts look to the reality of the defendant's situation.
In People v. Allen,42 the defendant was interrogated in his home
by officers who had been told by a woman that the defendant had
forcibly raped her. In a well-articulated opinion, the judge ruled
that the statements were inadmissible.4 3  In so holding, he held
irrelevant the absence of formal arrest, station-house interrogation,
and an interrogation atmosphere and environment. 44 Unfortunately,
this decision was reversed on appeal in a rather terse and shallow
memorandum opinion.45 Other courts have shared the views of the
trial judge in the Allen case.46 It is submitted that this is the correct
view. When the police have probable cause to suspect the detained
person of committing a crime, it must be assumed that at some point
during the confrontation they will perform their duty and formally
arrest the person.47 In the meantime, the person's freedom of move-
ment has been curtailed. 8
4 50 Misc. 2d 897, 272 N.Y.S.2d 249 (Sup. Ct. 1966), rev'd, 28 App. Div. 2d 724,
281 N.Y.S.2d 602 (1967). For a discussion of this case, see 33 BROOKLYN L. REV.
347 (1967).
43 50 Misc. 2d at 900, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 251.
44 Id. at 900, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 252. See People v. Vaiza, 244 Cal. App. 2d 121, 52 Cal.
Rptr. 733, 737 (1966) (questioning while defendant was in hospital bed).
45People v. Allen, 28 App. Div. 2d 724, 281 N.Y.S.2d 602 (1967) (the court used
"voluntariness" language).
"United States v. Harrison, 265 F. Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); People v. Arnold,
426 P.2d 515, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1967); People v. Golwitzer, 52 Misc. 2d 925,
277 N.Y.S.2d 209 (Sup. Ct. 1966); People v. Glover, 52 Misc. 2d 520, 276 N.Y.S.2d
461 (Sup. Ct.. 1966).
47 Who would be bold enough to suggest that an officer will walk away from one whom
he has probable cause to arrest?
48 It is possible that instead of approaching the question of custody from the standpoint
of analyzing the evidence possessed by the police, courts will establish some kind
of "totality of the circumstances" test. Under this test, the court would objectively
weigh all the facts and circumstances to determine whether the accused was in fact
free to leave. In making this determination, the court would consider the information
possessed by the officer, the nature of the questions asked, any expressed intention
on the part of the officer to detain, the situation as it would appear to a reasonable
person, and any other relevant circumstances. It is also likely that some courts may
decide to use a subjective standard which would examine the accused's state of mind
to ascertain whether he felt that his freedom of movement was restrained. The court
may also inquire into the officer's state of mind to determine the existence of an
intention to detain. The courts using the subjective test would be looking for the
effect of the facts and circumstances on the minds of the respective parties.
The California Supreme Court has apparently adopted a modification of the
subjective and objective tests: "We hold that custody occurs if the suspect is
physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way or is led to
believe, as a reasonable person, that he is so deprived." People v. Arnold, 426 P.2d
515, 521, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115, 121 (1967). This test deserves some comment. The
reference to "physically deprived" would seem to connote an arrest or its equivalent.
Thus, the fact that a person is a suspect may not be sufficient. One court, in applying
this test, has so held. People v. Hazel, 60 Cal. Rptr. 437, 441 n.3 (Ct. App. 1967).
If the person is not placed under arrest or taken to the police station, "custody"
apparently depends upon what the officer said to the suspect or upon the officer's
demeanor, and what compelling effect these words or actions would have on a
reasonable person. The fact that the officer had probable cause to arrest the accused
and would not have permitted him to leave would be irrelevant unless the officer's
subjective views had been communicated to the accused. However, the California
court gave some indication that it would still look to all the relevant circumstances
before determining the existence of custody. 426 P.2d at 522, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
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3. The Person Detained on Police Suspicions.
The discussion up to now has been limited to situations in
which the person's freedom of movement has been clearly curtailed.
Thus, the custody requirement has been satisfied. However, much
police activity centers around the "suspect." For purposes of dis-
cussion, if the police feel that a person is involved in the commis-
sion of a crime, but there is insufficient evidence to make an arrest,
that person is a "suspect." In the search for a test of "custody," the
question arises whether the fact that a person is a suspect, without
more, qualifies that person for the Miranda safeguards. The Supreme
Court has, by implication, recognized this possibility.49
Custody normally signifies some kind of restraint on the person
involved. However, when dealing with a suspect, physical restraint
may never be imposed unless the person either attempts to leave or
gives the police probable cause for arresting him. Thus, if ques-
tioning of a suspect is sufficient to invoke the safeguards of Miranda,
restraint or detention must be presumed from the presence of police
suspicions. The validity of presuming restraint is aided by the
Miranda opinion in which the Court, after laying out its definition
of custodial interrogation, said: "This is what we meant in Escobedo
when we spoke of an investigation which had focused on an ac-
cused."" ° Later in the opinion, the Court said:
We have concluded that without proper safeguards the process of
in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime
contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine
the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he
would not otherwise do so freely.51
It was this language which induced one court to find "custody"
when an officer approached the defendants after his suspicion had
been aroused by seeing them get into a taxi, carrying a phonograph
and a portable television set.52 That court remarked: "The man-
dated warnings apply to persons merely suspected as well as to per-
sons actually accused .... .
In another case, "4 a policeman approached the defendant, whom
the officer suspected of living in an apartment in which marijuana
had earlier been found. In holding subsequent statements inadmissi-
ble because of noncompliance with Miranda, the court said:
[W]hatever else Miranda may have intended "custody" to mean,
4 9 See Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 711 n.7 (1967) (dictum). See also Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 488 n.59 (1966).
50 384 U.S. at 444 n.4.
51 Id. at 467.
52 People v. Reason, 52 Misc. 2d 425, 276 N.Y.S.2d 196 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
53 Id. at 430, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 202. But see People v. Singleton, 63 Cal. Rptr. 324 (Ct.
App. 1967).
54 People v. Glover, 52 Misc. 2d 520, 276 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
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this much is apparent- police questioning of a person, wherever
detained, upon whom suspicion has already focused, appears ruled
to be "custodial interrogation.' "
5
Other courts have found custodial interrogation when officers ques-
tioned the defendant about his possible involvement in narcotics
violations,"6 when officers entered an apartment wherein they sus-
pected a heroin operation,57 and when the police were possessed of
sufficient facts to arouse in them a suspicion that a mother may have
murdered one of her children.5"
The official policy of the Denver Police Department"9 appears
to be that if a person be suspected of having committed a crime,
the officer must, prior to any questioning, advise the suspect of his
rights, and secure a waiver. The place of interrogation is irrelevant.
For example, the Miranda procedure would be followed if a detec-
tive proceeded to a person's home to question him, his only sus-
picion being that the person has a criminal record which reveals a
method of operation similar to that used in the commission of the
crime the detective is investigating. As with most policies, this is
subject to occasional abuse by individual officers.6"
There is another method of approaching the question whether
the fact of being a suspect is sufficient. If the person is "deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant way," 1 he is entitled to
55 Id. at 525, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 466.
5
6 United States v. Harrison, 265 F. Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
57 People v. Terrell, 53 Misc. 2d 32, 277 N.Y.S.2d 926 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
58 People v. Golwitzer, 52 Misc. 2d 925, 277 N.Y.S.2d 209 (Sup. Ct. 1966). See
People v. Beasley, 58 Cal. Rptr. 485, 491 (Ct. App. 1967). Some courts have not
been so benevolent, most of them holding that a situation involving a suspect was
either on the scene or routine questioning. See Williams v. United States, 381 F.2d
20, 22 (9th Cir. 1967) ; United States v. Manni, 270 F. Supp. 103, 106 (D. Mass.
1967) ; United States v. Kuntz, 265 F. Supp. 543, 547 (N.D.N.Y. 1967); United
States v. Appell, 259 F. Supp. 156, 158 (D. Mass. 1966) ; People v. Hazel, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 437, 440 (Ct. App. 1967) ; White v. United States, 222 A.2d 843, 845 (D.C.
Ct. App. 1966) ; Gaudio v. State, 1 Md. App. 455, 459, 230 A.2d 700, 703 (1967) ;
People v. Johnson, 50 Misc. 2d 1009, 1011-12, 271 N.Y.S.2d 814, 817 (Sup. Ct.
1966). Of course general on the scene questioning is permissible, Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966), but a Miranda situation may develop because
of the answers given in response. If such answers cause the investigation to focus
on the accused, then from that point on the questioning would become custodial in
nature and the person would have to be advised of his rights, and a waiver secured,
before the interrogation proceeds. People v. Glover, 52 Misc. 2d 520, 524-25, 276
N.Y.S.2d 461, 466 (Sup. Ct. 1966). See State v. Tellez, 6 Ariz. App. 251, 256,
431 P.2d 691, 696 (1967) (recognized the "focus" rule, but equated it with
probable cause).
59 As related in an interview with Lloyd Jamerson, Division Chief, Detective Division,
Denver Police Department, in Denver, Colorado, Sept. 5, 1967. The department
policy is based on an interpretation of Miranda.
60 One example may be given from observations made while riding on patrol. A woman
had her purse snatched from her on the streets, and she gave a general description
of the two culprits to the officers investigating the incident. Nearby, two suspects
fitting the same general description were picked up and brought to the scene for
identification. One of the officers practiced deception in an effort to induce the
suspects to confess. This proved fruitless, and the suspects were eventually released.
At no time were the suspects advised of their rights.
61 Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
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the Miranda protections. The key word is "significant." Presumably
the Court did not intend to equate it with "physical," or it would
have so stated. Therefore, if the requisite detention need not be
physical, yet must be more than general questioning in a non-
accusatory manner,62 it may be plausibly argued that a suspect is
deemed to be significantly restrained, independent of any physical
or formal pressures. Thus, regardless of the conduct of the police,
if they intend to question a suspect, Miranda would be applicable.
If the Supreme Court were to determine that all suspects are
placed in a situation sufficiently compelling to justify clothing them
with the Miranda safeguards, the question arises whether the police
suspicions need be reasonable. If, in retrospect, the Court determines
that the suspicion was ill-founded and unreasonable, is Miranda
nevertheless applicable? To resolve this, one need only look to the
relative positions of the characters. The effect of the situation on
the suspect remains the same, regardless of the reasonableness of
the suspicion. Likewise, reasonableness plays no part in determin-
ing the conduct of the interrogators. They are still focusing in on
the suspect, attempting to substantiate or disprove their suspicions.
Thus, the logical conclusion would be that reasonableness plays no
part in determining the applicability of Miranda.
By applying the Miranda proscriptions to suspects, a common
police practice known as "field interrogation" would be forced to
undergo radical changes. Broadly speaking, this practice consists of
stopping and questioning a person whom the officer suspects, but
has insufficient grounds for making a legal arrest.63  It is often
codified in a "stop-and-frisk" statute which gives the officer the
right to stop a person whom he suspects of committing a crime, and
to demand of him an explanation of his actions.64 The Supreme
Court has ruled on some of the issues relating to stopping and ques-
62Id. at 477-78.
63 See Tiffany, Field Interrogation: Administrative, Judicial and Legislative Approaches,
43 DENVER L.J. 389 (1966).
64 See, e.g., N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 180-a (1964). The statute also allows the officer
to frisk the persons for weapons, if he believes his safety is in danger. See Tiffany,
supra note 63, at 425-36. On the constitutional status of this statute, see Kuh,
Reflections on New York's "Stop-and-Frisk" Law and Its Claimed Unconstitutionality,
56 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 32 (1965) ; Note, Police Power to Stop, Frisk, and Question
Suspicious Persons, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 848 (1965); Note, The Law of Arrest:
Constitutionality of Detention and Frisk Acts, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 641 (1964).
It should be noted that the American Law Institute, although not fully complying
with Miranda, does require that a person be advised of his fifth amendment rights
prior to questioning. ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 2.01(2)
(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966). Cf. City v. Forrest, 35 U.S.L.W. 2443 (Cleve. Mun. Ct.,
Ohio, Jan. 4, 1967) (statute making it an offense to give unsatisfactory account
of oneself unconstitutional, citing Miranda).
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tioning suspicious persons,"5 but the Court has yet to evaluate this
police practice in light of Miranda.6 6
The foregoing discussion raises another interesting issue. Is the
non-suspect ever entitled to the benefit of Miranda? The issue would
arise in the situation where the police were questioning an uncoopera-
tive witness who, during the course of interrogation, confessed his
own guilt. One must bear in mind that the Supreme Court has ex-
plicitly excluded general questioning in the fact-finding process from
the Miranda arena. This appears to eliminate in-the-field questioning
of witnesses. But what about the witness who is taken from the
field to the station house for questioning? Does physical custody
plus questioning equal the requisite compulsion for purposes of the
fifth amendment? One can only speculate as to the Supreme Court's
feeling on this issue, but it could justifiably be said to be within
the protection of Miranda.
67
B. The Requirement of Questioning.
1. Acquisition of Verbal Evidence.
Strictly speaking, the suspect in custody need not be advised of
his right to remain silent and to seek the assistance of counsel until
the police intend to question him. If the police are prepared to
observe a vow of silence in their dealings with the person there
would seem to be no need for the advisement of rights. This means
complete silence. Even the simplest of questions are forbidden
without a proper advisement and waiver." For example, the re-
sponse to the general inquiry "Do you know what else you are under
arrest for?" has been held inadmissible."
The general statement that there must be some form of ques-
tioning may be too broad. If Miranda is to be limited to instances
where questioning is present, other non-interrogative police practices
may accomplish the same result - securing verbal evidence - with-
out the necessity for first complying with Miranda. To accomplish
65 Terry v. Ohio, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968); Sibron v. New York, 88 S.Ct. 1889 (1968).
For a discussion of the state of the law prior to these decisions see Tiffany, supra
note 63, at 398-411.
66 Terry v. Ohio, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968) ; Sibron v. New York, 88 S.Ct. 1889 (1968).
The Supreme Court defined the circumstances under which a stop and frisk would
be a reasonable search under the fourth amendment in these two cases; however,
Miranda was not the basis of the decisions.
67 See generally, LaFave, Detention for Investigation by the Police: An Analysis of
Current Practices, 1962 WASH. U.L.Q. 331. Cf. Reich, Police Questioning of Law
Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE L. REV. 1161 (1966).
68However, one court has held that Miranda could not be interpreted to exclude res
gestae statements, even though made in response to questions after the accused was
taken into custody. Hill v. State, 420 S.W.2d 408, 410-11 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967).
6 9 State v. Shoffner, 31 Wis. 2d 412, 143 N.W.2d 458, 468 (1966) (dictum). See
State v. La Femier, 155 N.W.2d 93, 99 (Wis. 1967) (whether defendant would
submit to a lie detector test).
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the intent and purpose of Miranda, should not Miranda be appli-
cable to any situation in which verbal evidence is acquired by some
affirmative action, or unfair inaction, on the part of the police?
Such non-verbal conduct may take the form of showing the suspect
a piece of tangible evidence. Thus, the showing of a hat by an offi-
cer and the defendant's statement of ownership were both excluded
by one court.7" The police conduct may also take the form of decep-
tion. The police may tell the suspect that a witness who is certain
he can identify him will arrive shortly, when in fact there is no
witness, or the witness remembers nothing. The police may follow
this up with the statement that it will go easier on the suspect if
he confesses now. Although technically there is no questioning,
there is an attempt to secure verbal evidence and the Court could
hold that custody plus deception equals compulsion and a violation
of the suspect's rights.7 ' Verbal statements may also be obtained
through unethical police inaction, such as incommunicado detention.
Miranda contains a statement to the effect that incommunicado
incarceration without questioning negates a waiver of rights. 72 Thus,
limiting Miranda to situations involving a question and answer ses-
sion may prove inadequate protection to the suspect.
2. Volunteered Statements.
The existence of questioning is also important in the classifica-
tion of what the Court calls "volunteered" statements. These state-
ments may be admitted into evidence without the necessity of proving
an advisement and a waiver. To use the Court's language:
Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any com-
pelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence. The funda-
mental import of the privilege while an individual is in custody is
not whether he is allowed to talk to the police without the benefit
of warnings and counsel, but whether he can be interrogated. There
is no requirement that police stop a person who enters a police
station and states that he wishes to confess to a crime, or a person
who calls the police to offer a confession or any other statement he
desires to make. Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred
by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by
our holding today.
73
One court has aptly described the admissibility of volunteered
statements in poetic style:
Once an utterance falls from the lips with extemporaneous
naturalness, there is no way to declare it non-existent. To order the
nullification of such a statement would be like ordering one to
re-attach an apple to a limb from which it had fallen, not because
70 State v. Ross, 269 N.C. 739, 153 S.E.2d 469, 472 (1967).
7 1 See People v. Watkins, 55 Misc. 2d 168, 284 N.Y.S.2d 365 (Buffalo City Ct. 1967).
72 384 U.S. at 476.
73 Id. at 478 (emphasis added).
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of the limb shaking or tree climbing, but in consequence of the
fruit's ripeness. . . .74
To compel policemen not to listen to volunteered statements
while investigating a homicide, is to put stoppers in their ears and
require them to snap handcuffs on their wrists.75
In one sense, an answer given to routine or other questioning
while the person is not in custody or effective detention may be said
to fall under the classification of "volunteered statements," in that
it is admissible without the advice and consent. However, it would
be more correct to say, not that the statement was volunteered, but
that it was not the product of compulsion.
Truly "volunteered" statements are those not the product of
any questioning. Of these, there are two classifications: those made
while not in custody, and those volunteered while in custody. Volun-
teered statements while not in custody may be donated in two types
of situations. First, as the Court indicated, the person may phone
the police or walk into the station and blurt out a confession.7 6 To
illustrate this, in one case the defendant walked into the police
station and, approaching the officer on duty, stated that he had
stolen a car. Initially, the officer did not believe him so the defend-
ant took the officer outside to view the car. The court correctly
held the statement to be volunteered.77
In the second noncustodial situation, the statement may be
volunteered at the scene of an investigation. This has occurred when
an officer, investigating a homicide, asked a person if he knew who
shot the deceased. The witness said the defendant shot him and the
defendant, standing nearby, said, "yes, I shot him."7 8
If from the time the statement was volunteered, the defendant
was no longer free to leave, then the Miranda rules would have
to be complied with before eliciting further information from the
defendant. This would occur if the statement was an acknowledg-
ment of guilt or otherwise focused suspicion on him.
By making the fifth amendment applicable to pre-trial situa-
tions, the inception of the duty of advising a person of his rights
under that amendment arises when the person is under compulsion,
74 Commonwealth v. Eperjesi, 423 Pa. 455, 224 A.2d 216, 220 (1966).
75 1d. at 221.
76 384 U.S. at 478. See Newhouse v. State, 420 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967);
Taylor v. State, 420 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967) (dictum).
77 Lung v. State, 420 P.2d 158 (Okla. Crim. App. 1966) ; accord, Taylor v. District
Court, 418 P.2d 112 (Okla. Crim. App. 1966). If, however, the police question the
defendant, Miranda may be applicable even though he voluntarily appeared at the
station to make a statement. People v. Bryant, 87 II. App. 2d 238, 231 N.E.2d 4
(1967).
78 State v. Oxentine, 270 N.C. 412, 415, 154 S.E.2d 529, 531 (1967). See State v.
Rudd, 49 N.J. 310. 230 A.2d 129 (1967) (dictum) (statement blurted out when
defendant was notified of relative's murder). See also People v. Mercer, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 861, 864 (Ct. App. 1967).
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which generally exists when two factors are present: custody and
questioning. Therefore, a person in custody may volunteer a state-
ment if it is not in response to a question and it may be used as
evidence. 79  This may occur when the person is initially placed in
custody,80 in the police car while on the way to the station,81 or while
within the police station."' It has also been held that a question and
answer which are merely repetitious of the volunteered statement
are not subject to suppression.83 If, however, the volunteered state-
ment was offered after other incriminating facts had been elicited
via unlawful interrogation, the later statement is most likely the
product or "fruit" of the prior illegality and thus inadmissible.8 4
Although this situation was present in at least one post-Miranda
case,85 no court has yet decided this issue in light of Miranda.86
C. The Exclusionary Rule and the Non-police Officer.
In spite of the increasing recognition given by the Supreme
Court to individual rights, one pressing problem has been largely,
if not wholly, neglected. It is axiomatic that a person has certain
rights which protect him from unwarranted police practices. If a
confession is obtained by the police in violation of Miranda, the
defendant may have it excluded from evidence. But it is said that
if a private person has obtained the confession without compliance
with Miranda, the defendant has no right to its exclusion in the
absence of a showing that the third party was the government's
agent.8 7 This state-private dichotomy apparently extends to all ex-
clusionary rules.
88
79 In the future, the Court may require that a person be advised of his rights the
moment he is placed in custody, but this has not yet been mandated.
80 Stone v. United States, 385 F.2d 713, 716-17 (10th Cir. 1967); Pitman v. United
States, 380 F.2d 368, 370 (9th Cir. 1967) ; Lamb v. Peyton, 273 F. Supp. 242, 246
(W.D. Va. 1967) ; People v. Jones, 244 Cal. App. 2d 378, 52 Cal. Rptr. 924, 926
(1966); Carwell v. State, 2 Md. App. 45, 50, 232 A.2d 903, 906 (1967). See
Balley v. People, 160 Colo. 309, 419 P.2d 446 (1966) (dictum).
81 Bivens v. State, 242 Ark. 362, 413 S.W.2d 653, 656 (1967); In re Orr, 38 Ill.
2d 417, 231 N.E.2d 424, 427 (1967).
8 2 People v. Kenny, 53 Misc. 2d 527, 279 N.Y.S.2d 198 (Sup. Ct. 1966); State v.
Hill, 422 P.2d 675 (Ore. 1966) ; cf. People v. Petker, 62 Cal. Rptr. 215 (Ct. App.
1967) (confession in response to question by parent in presence of officer).
83 United States v. Cruz, 265 F. Supp. 15 (W.D. Tex. 1967).
84 See discussion of "fruits," supra note 5.
85 People v. Kenny, 53 Misc. 2d 527, 279 N.Y.S.2d 198 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
86See Commonwealth v. White, 232 N.E.2d 235 (Mass. 1967) (defendant admitted
guilt to friends after police had garnered two inadmissible confessions from him).
87 See Yates v. United States, 384 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1967) ; People v. Wright, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 781 (Ct. App. 1967); State v. Masters, 154 N.W.2d 133 (Ia. 1967); Common-
wealth v. White, 232 N.E.2d 335 (Mass. 1967) ; State v. O'Kelly, 181 Neb. 618,
150 N.W.2d 117 (1967) ; Skinner v. State, 432 P.2d 675 (Nev. 1967) ; Schaumberg
v. State, 432 P.2d 500 (Nev. 1967) ; People v. Frank, 52 Misc. 2d 266, 275 N.Y.S.2d
570 (Sup. Ct. 1966); People v. Williams, 53 Misc. 2d 1086, 281 N.Y.S. 2d 251
(Syracuse City Ct. 1967).
88 See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921) (search and seizure).
LIMITATIONS ON MIRANDA
The Supreme Court authority for this distinction is Burdeau v.
McDowell,89 decided in 1921. McDowell had brought an action in
replevin for the return of property unlawfully seized from him by
a private person. He alleged that if the property was subsequently
used against him in a criminal proceeding, his fourth and fifth
amendment rights would be violated. The Court proceeded, with
comparable ease, to hold that no constitutional right had been vio-
lated. The two-step analysis was: 1) the fourth amendment pro-
tects one only against governmental action, as it was intended as
a restraint only upon the activities of a sovereign authority; 2) the
government was not involved in the seizure of McDowell's prop-
erty. ° Two distinguished Justices, Holmes and Brandeis, dissented.
The argument of the dissenters sounded of due process: "Respect
for law will not be advanced by resort, in its enforcement, to means
which shock the common-man's sense of decency and fair play."'"
The Burdeau case has not been overruled, but its present va-
lidity, in light of recent court decisions concerning individual rights,
may be in doubt. If subsequently overruled, reliance would prob-
ably be placed on the due process clause. However, one difficulty
is at once confronted: the Constitution reads that no "State" shall
deprive a person of liberty without due process of law. 2 Thus the
question in confession cases is whether the act of the judge in ad-
mitting into evidence the confession, elicited by a private person
in a manner illegal if done by a police officer, is state action. By
analogizing to Shelley v. Kraemer,13 an affirmative answer could
be reached. In that case, the state court had enforced a restrictive
covenant in a deed which forbade the sale of the property to a
Negro. The Supreme Court held that in so doing, the state court
had acted in violation of the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment. In reaching this result, the Court necessarily
had to find "state" action.94 The action by the court in enforcing
the covenant was held sufficient state activity to apply the fourteenth
amendment. 95 The analogy is clear. 'When a court admits a con-
fession, regardless of whether it was obtained by a government agent
or a private person, the act of admitting it constitutes state action
89 id.
901d. at 475. The fifth amendment contention was dismissed, the Court saying the
privilege protects a person only from extorted confessions and compulsory court
testimony.
91 Id. at 477.
92 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
93 334 U.S. 1 (1948).




to which the fourteenth amendment applies. The practical justifica-
tion for such a ruling has been stated as follows:
Any searches or statements to be taken can be more effectively
accomplished by the professional policemen trained to do these
things. I [sic] seems ludricous [sic] to say that a District Attorney
in prosecuting a Defendant cannot use evidence obtained by a
policeman in derogation of a Defendant's constitutional rights
but can use the same evidence obtained by a private person in
derogation of a Defendant's constitutional rights which in turn is
handed over to a policeman who then hands it over to a District
Attorney.9
6
Assuming that the action of a court in admitting a confession
is state action,97 special problems are presented in subjecting the
average citizen to the mandates of Miranda. The man on the street
neither knows, nor can be expected to know, the precise require-
ments of Miranda. On the other hand, there is a class of "private"
persons on whom we may justifiably impose the duty of knowing
and utilizing proper criminal procedure in their relations with sus-
pects. This class is composed of security guards, store detectives,
and others with like vocations. 8 These persons frequently encounter
persons suspected of crimes and often obtain evidence from them.
A security guard is primarily employed to detect and detain shop-
lifters and other violators. In view of the rights to be protected,
it would seem justifiable to subject them to the same duty as is
imposed on other law enforcement officials.
Concerning the duties of private persons under Miranda, two
alternatives are available. First, it could be said that no confession
or admission, whether it be obtained by a police officer or by any
other person, is admissible at trial unless, prior to custodial interro-
96 People v. Williams, 53 Misc. 2d 1086, 1091, 281 N.Y.S.2d 251, 256 (Syracuse City
Ct. 1967).
97 Even if the Supreme Court refused to hold that this, by itself, is state action, there
is another class of persons, albeit less than the whole of society, whose acts may be
termed "acts of the state." By statute, many states have authorized merchants and
their employees or agents to detain persons suspected of shoplifting or larceny, and
to question and/or search them for the purpose of ascertaining guilt or innocence.
Typical of these statutes is that of Colorado, which states that if a person is
suspected of committing shoplifting or concealing unpurchased goods,
the merchant or any employee thereof or any peace or police officer,
acting in good faith and upon probable cause based upon reasonable
grounds therefore, may question such person in a reasonable manner for
the purpose of ascertaining whether or not such person is guilty of shop-
lifting . . . . Such questioning . . . shall not render such [person) civilly
liable for slander, false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution
or unlawful detention.
COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-5-31 (1963). See also N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 218
(McKinney Supp. 1967). For a discussion of similar statutes, see 58 MicH, L. REV.
429 (1960).
Thus, by statute, the state has authorized merchants to conduct interrogations
of suspects. A fortiori, there is state action and the merchants must conform their
actions with due process. Cf. Hajdu v. State, 189 So.2d 230, 233 (Fla. 1966)
Thacker v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 702, 704, 221 S.W.2d 682, 683 (1949).
98 Others may have this duty imposed on them by statute. See COLo. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-5-31 (1963); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 218 (McKinney Supp. 1967).
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gation, the person obtaining it advised the detained person of his
rights and secured from him an effective waiver. This would un-
doubtedly result in eliminating from evidence all confessions ob-
tained by the average citizen. Nevertheless, it may be justified by
a concern for preserving the rights and dignity of the individual.
It is also an unnecessary, and often dangerous, practice for the citizen
to play the role of a policeman. 9 If a citizen apprehends an offender
he has done his part, and should leave the questioning to the trained
policeman. The situation is different when a security guard is in-
volved. He is usually given some training by his employer, and this
could easily include instruction in criminal procedure.
If the Supreme Court is unwilling to extend Miranda's rules to
all citizens, a compromise may be suggested, although it is subject
to criticism that it would create different standards of due process
depending on the identity of the interrogator. Under this alterna-
tive, all citizens would be subject to the 'voluntariness" test.' °0 If
a confession obtained by a citizen is found to be involuntary, it would
be excluded from evidence. This is the present rule,'0 ' derived from
the common law and directed at the exclusion of untrustworthy
evidence. From the general citizenry, a certain group would be re-
quired to comply with Miranda in its full strength. In addition to
law enforcement officials, this group would also include those per-
sons commonly referred to as security guards or store detectives.10 2
To avoid using a label to describe those persons who, in addition
to law enforcement officials, would be subject to compliance with
Miranda, the following test is proposed: a person must fully com-
ply with the constitutional safeguards if as part of his duties of
employment, he is required to protect persons and/or property and
to detect and apprehend violators of the law. 03 This group may be,
and is, broadened by statutes which authorize others to apprehend
and interrogate persons suspected of crime. Such authorization effec-
tively makes such persons agents of the government.0 4
9 9
See People v. Frank, 52 Misc. 2d 266, 275 N.Y.S.2d 570 (Sup. Ct. 1966); People
v. Williams, 53 Misc. 2d 1086, 1090-91, 281 N.Y.S.2d 251, 256 (Syracuse City Ct.
1967).
100 For a discussion of the "voluntariness" test, see note 2 supra.
101 See Commonwealth v. White, 232 N.E.2d 335 (Mass. 1967); Schaumberg v. State,
432 P.2d 500 (Nev. 1967).
102See People v. Ryff, 28 App. Div. 2d 1112, 284 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1967) (evidence
inadmissible where store detective questioned defendant and police officer merely
stood by).
103 One court has made an interesting comment: "Private businesses employ security
officers to protect persons and property on their premises, whose guns are just as
menacing and whose badges just as shiny as those hired by public agencies, whatever
their function may be." People v. Wright, 57 Cal. Rptr. 781, 782 (Ct. App. 1967).
It should be noted that the court added the requirement that for Miranda to apply
the person must be employed by a government agency whose "primary mission is
to enforce the law." Id.
104 See note 97 supra.
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An important question for future litigation is whether Miranda
applies to all crimes; if not, to what crimes does it apply? The
Court's answer will largely determine the effectiveness of Miranda.
The only limitation evidenced in Miranda, other than the fact that
all the cases involved felonies, 10 is that during custodial interroga-
tion, there are "restraints society must observe consistent with the
Federal Constitution in prosecuting individuals for crime."' ' This
is consistent with the language of the fifth amendment,10 ' and would
seem to include all crimes, regardless of their distinctive label. How-
ever, in the federal courts there has developed a class of crimes
denoted "petty offenses,"' 0 8 to which the Supreme Court has held
that certain constitutional rights do not apply.'
This distinction, and its present validity as it relates to whether
a person is afforded the constitutional guarantees in a criminal case,
is in need of reconsideration. The distinction receives little support
in historical fact. ° And only recently, in In re Gault,"' the Court
said:
[O]ur Constitution guarantees that no person shall be 'compelled'
to be a witness against himself when he is threatened with depriva-
tion of his liberty - a command which this Court has broadly
applied and generously implemented in accordance with the teach-
ings of the history of the privilege and its great office in mankind's
battle for freedom.
11 2
In an earlier circuit case, the court commented on the degree of depri-
vation required: "ET]he Constitution draws no distinction between
loss of liberty for a short period and such loss for a long one.
'"" 3
In light of the fact that no person may be deprived of his lib-
erty without due process of law,' 4 which now includes the fifth
105 One court has relied on this factual limitation to exclude from Miranda's application
all misdemeanors. State v. Angelo, 251 La. 250, 203 So.2d 710 (1967).
106 384 U.S. at 439 (emphasis added).
107 U. S. CONST. amend. V: "'No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself ...." (emphasis added).
10 See 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1964), in which, after defining felonies and misdemeanors,
it is stated: "Any misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed imprisonment
for a period of six months or a fine of not more than $500, or both, is a petty
offense."
10gDistrict of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624 (1937) (no right to jury).
Contra, District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (1930). For a critical discussion
of the "petty offense" distinction, see Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peers, 26 U.
CHI. L. REv. 245 (1959).
11o See Kaye, supra note 109, at 257-77.
11 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
112 Id. at 50 (emphasis added).
113 Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (held that a misdemeanant
has a right to counsel). As to the right of counsel in misdemeanor cases see Note,
The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 48 CAL. L. REV. 501 (1960).
114 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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amendment privilege against self-incrimination,"' a workable test
for the application of Miranda could be devised: a person is entitled
to the safeguards enumerated in Miranda if the law which he is
suspected of violating provides for imprisonment for any period of
time, however short." 6 If the statutory punishment is a fine, the
person still may not be imprisoned for inability to pay the fine im-
posed, if a Miranda violation contributed to his conviction.
In applying this test, special mention need be made only of its
application to traffic offenses. Some courts seem reluctant to extend
Miranda to this type of offense."17 Aside from the "deprivation of
liberty" argument, the courts holding Miranda inapplicable have said
that a traffic offense is not a crime." 8 One court stated that al-
though the questioning was "custodial," Miranda did not apply
because a state statute provided that a traffic violation was not a
crime and the punishment therefore was not to be termed "criminal"
punishment."' Query: may a state deprive a person of his constitu-
tional rights merely by attaching a label to the punishment it im-
poses? In light of the Gault ° case, it would seem that the answer
is no. In speaking of delinquency proceedings, the following lan-
guage of the Court is relevant:
[Juvenile proceedings to determine "delinquency" which may lead
to commitment to a state institution, must be regarded as "criminal"
for purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination. To hold
otherwise would be to disregard substance because of the feeble
enticement of the "civil" label-of-convenience which has been
attached to juvenile proceedings .... It is incarceration against one's
will whether it is called "criminal" or "civil."' 2'
115 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
116 See Conway, Is Criminal or Civil Procedure Proper for Enforcement of Traffic Laws?
-Part I, 1959 Wis. L. REv. 418, 434 (1959) ; accord, Note, Initial Imprisonment
For the Violation of City Ordinances, 31 IND. L.J. 486 (1956). Some courts have,
in the area of traffic offenses, distinguished between those offenses which provide
for a term of imprisonment and those which do not, holding that Miranda has no
application to the latter. State v. Zucconi, 93 N.J. Super. 380, 226 A.2d 16 (1967) ;
Commonwealth v. Renner, 1 BNA CRIM. L. REP. 2344 (Mercer County Ct., Pa.
1967). This distinction leaves itself open to criticism that perhaps situations exist
where the mere levy of a substantial fine would justify procedural safeguards. The
argument may run along these lines: unless the safeguards surrounding a criminal
trial are available in a case in which a defendant may be subject to a heavy fine,
the defendant is deprived of his property without due process of law, as proscribed
by the fourteenth amendment. See Conway, Is Criminal or Civil Procedure Proper
for Enforcement of Traffic Laws?-Part II, 1960 Wis. L. REV. 3, 15 (1960).
117See, e.g., People v. Bliss, 53 Misc. 2d 472, 474-75, 278 N.Y.S.2d 732, 735-36
(Allegany County Ct. 1967) (court applied "voluntariness" test) ; City of Columbus
v. Hayes, 9 Ohio App. 2d 38, 222 N.E.2d 829, 830 (1967). Cf. State v. Angelo,
251 La. 250, 203 So. 2d 410 (1967); People v. Letterio, 16 N.Y.2d 307, 213
N.E.2d 670, 266 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 911 (1966).
118 In Colorado, a traffic offense is a crime. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-5-2 (1963).
119People v. Bliss, 53 Misc. 2d 472, 474-76, 278 N.Y.S.2d 732, 735-37 (Allegany
County Ct. 1967).
120In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
12
1 Id. at 49. See In re Narcotic Control Comm'n, 1 BNA CuM. L. REP. 2307 (N.Y




Most courts have indicated that, assuming the presence of "custody,"
Miranda will apply to traffic violations.'
II. THE ADVISEMENT
Once a suspect is to be subjected to custodial interrogation, the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is activated.2 3
The government may not thereafter secure evidence against him "by
the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth.
''
124
However, like all constitutional rights, the suspect may make an
intelligent waiver of the fifth amendment protection.' 2 Inasmuch
as a person cannot make an intelligent choice to speak unless he is
aware that a choice exists, 2 6 the Supreme Court has said that "the
accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights
'
127
prior to any questioning.
Although the person may in fact be aware of his rights, the
advisement is an "absolute prerequisite to interrogation.'1 28  The
Court "will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the de-
fendant was aware of his rights without a warning being given.' '129
Thus, if no advisement was administered or if it was incomplete,'
30
a proclaimed awareness by the suspect will not suffice. There is a
conclusive presumption that the person who is not completely ad-
vised of his rights is unaware of them.'
For an advisement to comply with Miranda, it must be (1)
adequate in scope, and (2) communicated in a manner as to insure
awareness. The scope of the advisement is four fold. In the words
af the Court:
[Hie must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that
he has the right to remain silent .... 132
12 2 See People v. Nieto, 55 Cal. Rptr. 546, 549 (Ct. App. 1966) (dictum), cert. denied,
387 U.S. 911 (1967); People v. Schwartz, 53 Misc. 2d 635, 637, 279 N.Y.S.2d
477, 480 (Dist. Ct. 1967); State v. Meunier, 126 Vt. 176, 224 A.2d 922 (1966).
But see State v. Tellez, 6 Ariz. App. 251, 255-56, 431 P.2d 691, 695-96 (1967)
(applicability of Miranda depends upon the seriousness of the traffic offense or
whether arrest was made) ; cf. Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A Stud), in
Faith and Hope, 42 NEB. L. REv. 483, 515 (1963).
123 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966).
1
2
4 Id. at 460.
125 Id. at 475.
128 Id. at 468.
127 Id. at 467. An additional reason for advising the person of his rights is to overcome
the "inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere." Id. at 468.
1
28 Id. at 471.
12 id. at 468.
130 See People v. Powell, 429 P.2d 137, 59 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1967) (dictum).
131 See United States v. Miller, 261 F. Supp. 442, 446 (D. Del. 1966). But see State
v. Persinger, 433 P.2d 867 (Wash. 1967).
132 384 U.S. at 467-68. See United States v. Mullings, 364 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1966)
(advising person he has right not to say anything he feels may incriminate him, held
insufficient) ; But see Keegan v. United States, 385 F.2d 260 (9th Cir. 1967) ("You
don't have to say anything without the presence of an attorney," held sufficient).
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The warning of the right to remain silent must be accom-
paied by the explanation that anything said can and will be used
against the individual in court.' 3 3
[He] must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult
with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interroga-
tion.1
8 4
[I]t is necessary to warn him not only that he has the right to
consult with an attorney, but also that if he is indigent, a lawyer will
be appointed to represent him.
13 5
It will be noticed that the Court has used the words "clear and un-
equivocal." Ritualistic compliance in terminology which the person
cannot understand will be insufficient. "The purpose.. . is to enable
a suspect to intelligently rationalize, for a man unable to understand
the warning or the consequences must also be unable to understand
what he does in waiving the privilege.' 3 6 Thus, advising the per-
son in a half hearted manner, conveying an indifference which sug-
gests to the defendant that the speaker does not really mean what
he is saying, may be fatal to the prosecution's case."' The same
result will occur if other psychological techniques are utilized to
hinder the accused's free exercise of his rights.
No particular wording for the advisement is necessary and the
Court will look to substance, not form. 3 8 There is also no require-
ment that the advisement be in writing,3 9 but such a procedure
would facilitate the burden of proving that the person was, in fact,
adequately advised.
The Denver Police Department, after several modifications,
currently administers a form which states:
You have a right to remain silent.
Anything you say can be used as evidence against you in court.
You have a right to talk to a lawyer before questioning and have
him present during questioning.
If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before
questioning.
Do you understand each of these rights I have read to you?140
When the person indicates that he understands his rights and the
advising officer is convinced that he does, the person signs the form,
indicating his comprehension. If there is doubt that the person
133 384 U.S. at 469.
134 Id. at 471.
1
35 Id. at 473.
136 People v. Dumas, 51 Misc. 2d 929, 936, 274 N.Y.S.2d 764, 774 (Sup. Ct. 1966);
accord, Coyote v. United States, 380 F.2d 305, 308 (10th Cir. 1967) (sufficiency
depends upon age, background and intelligence of suspect).
137 The issue may not arise if the defendant can read and is allowed to read his rights
on a printed form. See Bell v. United States, 382 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1967).
1
38 See Tucker v. United States, 375 F.2d 363, 369 (8th Cir. 1967).
139 Cf. People v. Hansard, 245 Cal. App. 2d 691, 53 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1966).
140 Denver Police Department, Form 369, June, 1967.
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understands, the advisement procedure will be repeated. This form
appears to be sufficient, except for one particular -the advice on
the rights of the indigent. It is misleading as it implies the person
will be supplied with an attorney without any need of a request.
The present language should be supplemented by the addition of
"if you wish one."
The procedure to be followed in advising the person of his
rights was clearly articulated in Miranda and courts have had little
difficulty in applying it. Perhaps the issue most encountered is
whether a confession must be excluded if the person was not ad-
vised of the indigent's right to appointed counsel. There was lan-
guage in Miranda which suggested that if, in fact, the person was
not indigent, an advisement incomplete in this respect was harmless
error,14 ' and the courts are in unanimous agreement.' 42 However, if
the person was indigent, nonadvisement is reversible error. 43
As the advisement as it is presently administered poses no sub-
stantial difficulty in application, future litigation will undoubtedly
focus on the addition of rights heretofore unrequired as part of the
advisement. Although the Court's four-part advisement contem-
plates informing the suspect of the totality of his rights, it is not all-
encompassing. The majority opinion contains an additional right
which the Court did not specifically require as part of the advise-
ment. The Court mentioned that although a person may initially
waive his rights, he is not thereby later estopped from asserting
them, during the course of the interrogation.' 44 The Court stated:
"If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or
during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interroga-
tion must cease.' '1 45 Thus the individual should be advised that he
may terminate questioning at any time, even though he originally
waives his rights.
The need for such an advisement is evident, since the Court
has emphasized that a waiver must be knowingly made, 4 ' and since
many persons may reasonably believe that once they have waived
141 384 U.S. at 473 n.42.
142 See, e.g., United States v. Lubitsch, 266 F. Supp. 294, 297-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1967);
United States v. Hecht, 259 F. Supp 581, 583 (W.D. Pa. 1966); O'Neal v. State,
115 Ga. App. 100, 101, 153 S.E.2d 663, 664 (1967); Commonwealth v. Wilbur,
231 N.E.2d 919, 923 (Mass. 1967); State v. Gray, 268 N.C. 69, 83, 150 S.E.2d
1, 11 (1966). However, to speak in terms of "indigency" is superficially simple.
A crucial question is, by what standards does one determine who is, in fact, an
"indigent"?
143 People v. Trumpour, 61 Cal. Rptr. 899 (Ct. App. 1967) ; Robinson v. State, 1 Md.
App. 522, 231 A.2d 920 (1967).
144 384 U.S. at 475-77. For a discussion of the language which may be used to indicate
a desire to terminate questioning, see Brooks v. State, 229 A.2d 833, 836 (Del.
1967).
145 384 U.S. at 473-74 (emphasis added).
'14 d. at 473-75.
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their rights they are no longer able to retract the waiver and claim
the privilege. The danger becomes more apparent when one realizes
that the effect of the waiver varies, depending on whether it is given
during trial or at the pre-trial stage. During the trial, an initial
waiver prevents a person from refusing to answer questions con-
cerning subjects already broached by his preceding testimony.'47
The Court has presumed that every person is unaware of his right
to remain silent and of the effect of waiving it. The same rationale
should apply to informing the person of the tentative nature of
his waiver.'48
III. WAIVER
After the person has been meaningfully advised of his fifth and
sixth amendment rights, one more procedural step must be taken
before any questioning may commence. The person must knowingly
and intelligently waive his right to remain silent and his right to the
assistance of counsel.' 49 In the words of the Court:
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear.
If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or
during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation
must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise
his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person
invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion,
subtle or otherwise. . . . If the individual states that he wants an
attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.
At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer
with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent
questioning. If the individual cannot obtain an attorney and he
indicates that he wants one before speaking to police, they must
respect his decision to remain silent.'5 0
The question of waiver may prove to be the most difficult and
most litigated of the Miranda issues. Its resolution requires the
court to consider the defendant - his age, intelligence, education
47 See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951). See also Miranda v. United
States, 384 U.S. 436, 476 n.45 (1966).
148 The FBI appears to have included it in its advisement form. See Elsen and Rosett,
Protections for the Suspect Under Miranda v. Arizona, 67 COLUm. L. REV. 645,
653 n.36 (1967).
Another requirement that may be forthcoming is that a person be advised of
the nature of the crime involved. See United States v. Washington, 341 F.2d 277
(3d Cir. 1965). In many cases, the seriousness of the offense would be relevant
to the defendant's decision whether or not to speak. Compliance with such a
requirement, however, may be difficult in those situations in which the exact nature
of the crime has not been determined. See People v. Lara, 432 P.2d 202, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 586 (1967) (no advice needed as to elements of crime, possible defenses, or
penalty for no crime had yet been charged). One might also ponder whether the
advisement should include the statement that the fact of silence or claim of privilege
cannot be revealed at trial. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966). See
Note, Tacit Criminal Admissions in Light of the Expanding Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 52 CORNELL L. REV. 335 (1967).
149 384 U.S. at 473-75.
150 id. at 473-74 (emphasis added).
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and background. Also to be considered is the atmosphere in which
the defendant was placed - the demeanor of the interrogation, and
the presence, if any, of physical force, threats, psychological coercion,
trickery, promises, inducements, lengthy interrogation, or incommuni-
cado detention. Add to this the testimony as to the rights advise-
ment form and the reply of the defendant subsequent to the advise-
ment, and the complexity of the resolution of the waiver issue be-
comes only more apparent. The limitations on Miranda which will
develop in the area of waiver will depend on the significance, or
lack of it, attached by the courts to each of the above factors.
A. A Knowing and Intelligent Waiver.
The initial inquiry in determining "waiver" is, was the advise-
ment given in a manner which the defendant could understand?
By definition, a waiver is "an intentional relinquishment or abandon-
ment of a known right .... "1" A man who is unable to understand
the advisement or the consequences of speaking must also be unable
to understand what he is doing when he makes a waiver. He must
make the waiver with complete knowledge, cognition, and aware-
ness of what he is doing when he makes his decision.
A related facet of this is whether the person has the mental
competence or the educational background to make an intelligent
waiver. 152 Certainly there are situations in which even the mentally
dwarfed could make a valid waiver if the advisement procedure was
characterized by painstaking simplicity.'" However, courts should
carefully scrutinize the facts, including the evidence which may be
offered by the defense, before making a finding of waiver. The
government should probably not be required to prove mental com-
petency unless it is placed in issue by defense counsel."'
Mental instability or insanity will permit a finding of non-
waiver.1 5' As one court said:
Confessions should not be allowed to be used simply because
it is possible that the defendant confessed during a period of mental
competence where there is a probability that the defendant was
insane. 156
For example, a person suffering from a form of paranoia or schizo-
151 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (emphasis added).
152 In pre-Miranda cases, these factors were regarded as significant in deciding the sub-
sequent admissibility of statements. See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449
(1957); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957).
1
5 3 See Elrod v. State, 202 So. 2d 539, 541-42 (Ala. 1967) (waiver by an illiterate).
554 See People v. Dumas, 51 Misc. 2d 929, 938, 274 N.Y.S.2d 764, 775 (Sup. Ct.
1966).
155 See People v. Golwitzer, 52 Misc. 2d 925, 277 N.Y.S.2d 209 (Sup. Ct. 1966); cf.
People v. Baksys, 26 App. Div. 2d 648, 272 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1966) (epileptic
seizure).
156 People v. Golwitzer, 52 Misc. 2d 925, 929, 277 N.Y.S.2d 209, 213 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
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phrenia may have a distorted picture of the interrogation process,
and the practical consequences of waiving his rights. His psycho-
logical imbalance negates the requirement that he comprehend what
he is doing.
Also, the defendant may not be competent to waive his rights
if he was under the influence of alcohol' 157 or drugs.5s to such an
extent that his reflexes were uncertain or his thinking unclear. The
effect of drugs or liquors may so insensitize the accused's cognitive
process that he loses awareness of what he is doing, and what the
result of his decision will be. This would necessarily be a question
of fact, and a difficult one. It is interesting to note that in Denver,
the police will attempt to secure a waiver from those who are to be
charged with driving under the influence. This would seem to place
the police in a paradoxical situation if a statement is obtained: on
the one hand, they will argue that the defendant was sober enough
to make an intelligent, knowing and voluntary waiver; on the other,
he was too intoxicated to drive. Depending on the court's definition
of intoxication for purposes of waiver, these two contentions may
be internally consistent.'5 "
A special problem is also presented when the situation involves
waiver by a juvenile of his rights.' 6° The younger the accused, the
less developed are his intellectual capacities and capabilities. Al-
though it has been doubted whether a juvenile can ever make an
effective waiver,' the Supreme Court in the Gault decision. 2 gave
no indication of this. 1 3 The Court did outline some of the issues
when it said:
We appreciate that special problems may arise with respect to waiver
of the privilege by or on behalf of children, and that there may well
be some differences in technique - but not in principle - depend-
ing upon the age of the child and the presence and competence of
parents. The participation of counsel will, of course, assist the
police, juvenile courts and appellate tribunals in administering the
157 See State v. Clark, 102 Ariz. 550, 434 P.2d 636 (1967) (court held significant the
fact that defendant could tell a clever lie) ; cf. Ballay v. People, 160 Colo. 309, 419
P.2d 446 (1966) ; Peters v. Commonwealth, 403 S.W.2d 686 (Ky. App. 1966).
158 Cf. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); People v. Waack, 100 Cal. App. 2d
253, 223 P.2d 486 (1950); People v. Townsend, 11 IIl. 2d 30, 141 N.E.2d 729
(1957).
'
59 See Logner v. North Carolina, 260 F.Supp. 970, 977 (D.N.C. 1966) (held that
defendant's waiver, after being arrested for driving under the influence, was inef-
fectual ).
160Miranda applies to juveniles. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967). The Court said
that "admissions and confessions of juveniles require special caution," but the same
was true under the traditional voluntariness test. Id. at 45. See, e.g., Gallegos v.
Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948). See also
People v. Rodriguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 253 (Ct. App. 1967).
161 See In re Rust, 53 Misc. 2d 51, 59, 278 N.Y.S.2d 333, 341 (Fam. Ct. 1967).
162 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
163 But see Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
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privilege. If counsel was not present for some permissible reason
when an admission was obtained, the greatest care must be taken to
assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that
it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product
of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.'
64
Although there may be situations in which a juvenile by himself
may be able to make an effective waiver,1 65 the safer and more de-
sirable practice would be to have at least one of his parents present.
Although presence of counsel may be required if the juvenile's par-
ents are unavailable, no one seemingly has the right to force an
attorney on a juvenile.
The practice in Denver seems both sufficient and desirable, and
reflects compliance with the Colorado Children's Code. 6 ' Juveniles
are never interrogated without a parent, guardian, or legal custodian
being present, for, by statute, this is a condition to the admissibility
of any subsequent statement.'6 7 Both the juvenile and the parent
are given the same advisement as would an adult suspect. 6 ' Then
the juvenile and his parent are left alone to discuss the situation.
If the juvenile decides to waive his rights, and the parent approves
of that decision, they each sign the form, indicating their respective
consent and approval.
1 69
B. The Express or Affirmative Waiver.
After a person has been advised of his rights, and assuming
that he understands them, he must still make an affirmative or ex-
press waiver.' 7 ° It is not clear what language will permit a finding
of waiver, but the Court has marked the boundaries. The clearly
permissible is a statement by the defendant that he is willing to talk
to the officer and does not want an attorney.' 7 ' The clearly im-
permissible is a finding of waiver from the defendant's silence.
1 72
164 387 U.S. at 55 (dictum).
165 See People v. Rodriguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 253, (Ct. App. 1967) ; cf. State v. Gullings,
244 Ore. 173, 416 P.2d 311 (1966) ; State v. Casey, 244 Ore. 168, 416 P.2d 665
(1966).
166 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-1-1 et seq. (Supp. 1967).
1
67 Id. § 22-2-2 '(3) (c).
168 See text accompanying note 140, supra.
169 The waiver form in Denver is in the following language:
THESE RIGHTS HAVE BEEN READ TO US. WE HAVE TALKED
TOGETHER ABOUT THESE RIGHTS AND THIS SITUATION. WE
UNDERSTAND THESE RIGHTS.
I know what I am doing, I now wish to voluntarily talk to you.
Juvenile: ........................
I approve of my .......... decision to talk to you.
A dult: ..........................
2





Of course, any express "claim" of privilege by the person will pre-
vent questioning.'
In Denver, the waiver, as expressed on the form, states: "Know-
ing my rights and knowing what I am doing, I now wish to volun-
tarily talk to you."'7 4 This raises the interesting problem of whether
the express waiver of the right to remain silent necessarily includes
a waiver of the right to counsel. This is probably a valid waiver,
because the person has indicated he wishes to talk even though he
has been advised that he may consult with an attorney before saying
anything.'75
However, a waiver of the right to counsel in no way implies a
waiver of the right to remain silent. A disclaimer of the need for
an attorney is perfectly consistent with a desire to remain silent.
In the only decision on point, however, the court found a waiver.17
The court seemed to be looking for an affirmative "claim" of the
fifth amendment right, as it found significant the fact that despite
his earlier denials of guilt, he in no way indicated a disinclination
to continue the question and answer session.' 
7
A statement by the defendant that he would talk but would not
sign a statement has been held not to constitute a waiver.' 78 The
court felt that he must have misunderstood the advisement, for the
declaration reasonably indicated that he was not willing to make a
statement that could be used against him.179 A statement by the
defendant that he was aware of his legal rights has also been said
to be inadequate as a waiver, 8 0 as was the statement: "all right."'1
8'
But a declaration by the defendant that he wished to waive his
"rights" has been held sufficient.' It is safe to assume that the
173 But see Farley v. United States, 381 F.2d 357, 359 (5th Cir. 1967). In that case, the
defendant told the interrogator to see his attorney. Although finding that defendant
had claimed his privilege, the court sanctioned one question and answer for it had
only a "remote bearing" on his guilt.
174 Denver Police Department, Form 369, June, 1967.
17 Keegan v. United States, 385 F.2d 260, 264 (9th Cir. 1967). See United States v.
Hayes, 385 F.2d 375, 377 (4th Cir. 1967) (boiler-plate clauses). However, one
cannot be overcautious in view of the premium placed on an affirmative waiver by
the Court. The advisable procedure would be to include a statement that "I do not
wish to talk to an attorney or have one present during questioning." Cf. Brisbon v.
State, 201 So.2d 832, 833-34 (Fla. 1967).
176 Tucker v. United States, 375 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1967).
177 Id. at 369.
178 People v. Thiel, 26 App. Div. 2d 897, 274 N.Y.S.2d 417, 418 (1966).
179 Id.
180 People v. Powell, 429 P.2d 137, 59 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1967) (dictum). But see People
v. Sainz, 61 Cal. Rptr. 196, 199 (Ct. App. 1967) (dictum) (reply of "yes" he under-
stood his rights, was said to be waiver); State v. Brown, 250 La. 1125, 1140, 202
So. 2d 274, 279 (1967) ("I know all that," held waiver).
181 United States v. Low, 257 F. Supp. 606, 614 (W.D. Pa. 1966).
182 United States v. Theriault, 268 F. Supp. 314 (W.D. Ark. 1967).
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waiver need not take a precise legal form, 8 ' but it should encom-
pass a waiver of both the right of counsel and of silence.
C. Waiver and the Right to Counsel.
When an attorney is requested by the defendant, several situa-
tions may develop which call for careful attention before finding a
subsequent waiver. For example, a troublesome question is pre-
sented when the defendant has given a statement after indicating
a desire to see an attorney but before the attorney is present. In such
a situation, a waiver could be found but only if the person clearly
articulates his change of mind and his desire to talk to the police.'
Miranda states:
If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation
must cease until an attorney is present.... If the individual cannot
obtain an attorney and he indicates that he wants one before speaking
to police, they must respect his decision to remain silent.185
If a statement is obtained, the circumstances should be suspect. 8
However, just as the person is not estopped to invoke his privilege
after an initial waiver,' 87 so the person may expressly retract his
earlier claim of privilege and talk to the police.' 88
The circumstances should also be carefully scrutinized before
making a finding of waiver when a statement is made after a re-
tained or appointed attorney has said that his client will answer no
questions. The Court did say that questioning may be permissible
even after the defendant indicates a desire to remain silent, if his
attorney is present. 8 0 However, "the exercise of those rights must
be fully honored."' 9 °
What if a statement is obtained in the absence of retained or
appointed counsel? Even though, as one court has said, "the de-
fendant himself is the final arbiter of the conduct of his defense,"' 1
183 Brisbon v. State, 201 So. 2d 832, 834 (Fla. 1967); State v. Yough, 49 N.J. 587,
596-97, 231 A.2d 598, 603 (1967).
184 Cf. United States v. Slaughter, 366 F.2d 833, 843, 846 (4th Cir. 1966) (dictum).
Compare State v. Rosenberger, 240 Ore. 376, 409 P.2d 684 (1966) with People v.
Stockman, 63 Cal. 2d 494, 407 P.2d 277, 47 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1965).
185 384 U.S. at 474.
186 However, one court found a waiver when the defendant changed his mind about
retaining an attorney after the officer told him that he wished to conduct the investi-
gation in private and without any publicity. State v. LaFernier, 155 N.W.2d 93 (Wis.
1967).
187 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966).
188 See Narro v. United States, 370 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1966); State v. Sanford, 421
P.2d 988 (Ore. 1966) (dictum). If, however, the attorney arrives and is denied
access to his client, there is a violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 465 n.35 (1966).
189 384 U.S. at 474 n.44. The Denver Police follow this procedure but rarely, if ever,
does the attorney allow the defendant to say anything.
190 Id. at 467.
191 People v. Baker, 28 App. Div. 2d 24, 26, 281 N.Y.S.2d 161, 163 (1967).
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a finding of waiver should rarely, if ever, be made unless the de-
fendant volunteers to talk to the police without any prodding on
their part, and, unless it appears that the accused deliberately and
understandingly chose to forego his rights. 192  Nevertheless, one
court has found a waiver in a situation in which an attorney brought
his client, wanted for murder, into the police station to surrender,
informing the authorities that his client would not say anything.' 5 '
After the attorney left the station, the "inquisition" began with
various detectives asking questions which the defendant refused to
answer. Later, after the defendant was taken to his cell, a detective
went to see him. The defendant asked why a crowd had gathered
outside the station. The detective informed the defendant that they
were waiting to "see" him, and, sensing the situation, asked the
defendant if there was anything he would like to "get off his chest."
Whereupon, the defendant began to answer questions.' It is sub-
mitted that the court, in finding a waiver, was in error.' 95
D. The Voluntary Waiver.
Even though the person has articulated an express waiver, made
only after a knowledge and understanding of his rights, other fac-
tors must be considered before a finding of "waiver" may be made.
These factors may be grouped under a "voluntariness" label, making
it reminiscent of the pre-Miranda test for the admissibility of con-
fessions. Although admissibility is no longer governed solely by
the question of the confession's voluntariness, the determination of
whether the circumstances indicate that the person was able to make
an unfettered and voluntary exercise of his rights will remain an
important question for the trial court. Proof of any of these factual
criteria strongly militates against the validity of the waiver.
The Court said that notwithstanding police testimony or other
evidentiary corroborations, "the fact of lengthy interrogation ... be-
fore a statement is made is strong evidence that the accused did not
192 One court has indicated it may exercise its federal supervisory powers to exclude a
statement made by one who is not in custody but who is known to have counsel,
retained or appointed, unless he executes an understanding waiver. United States v.
Smith, 379 F.2d 628, 633-34 (7th Cir. 1967) (dictum).
193 People v. Baker, 28 App. Div. 2d 24, 26, 281 N.Y.S.2d 161, 163 (1967).
194 Chief Jamerson of the Detective Division, Denver Police Department, indicates that
often, after his attorney has left, a defendant will send word from the jail that he
wants to talk to a detective. He also indicated that there may be situations when the
detectives will "offer" the defendant another opportunity to waive his rights after
the attorney has gone. Until the court rules otherwise, he feels his department is not
bound by even a written directive from the attorney that his client will not submit
to any questioning. Interview with Lloyd Jamerson, Division Chief, Detective Divi-
sion, Denver Police Department, in Denver, Colorado, Sept. 5, 1967.
195 Even if the defendant had the capacity to make an affirmative waiver, the record
showed only that the defendant answered inquiries. Miranda reveals that a valid




validly waive his rights."' 96 This is consistent with earlier language
in Miranda that an express disclaimer of one's rights "followed
closely by a statement could constitute a waiver.""' It indicates the
Court's belief that if the person has actually waived his rights, he
will make a statement in short order. The longer the time span, the
less trustworthy the statement will be. Thus, it would seem incum-
bent upon the interrogators to work swiftly. This would also seem
to dispel any doubts that, in a series of interrogations, a waiver must
be secured before each interview.198 By requiring the evidence sought
to be used to closely follow an express waiver, the Court seemingly
has required that the advisement be repeated and a waiver secured
each time the defendant is interrogated. 99
Incommunicado incarceration without questioning is also strong
evidence of nonwaiver.'0° This reflects the Court's belief that a
period of isolation will have an adverse effect on the willpower
of the accused which interferes with his ability to subsequently make
a valid waiver. The police would seemingly encounter no difficulty
here if they have provided the defendant with adequate food and
sanitary facilities during the interim, and have permitted him free
access to friends and relatives.
201
Another prerequisite to a voluntary waiver is a finding that the
police have practiced no deception on the defendant: "[A]ny evi-
dence that the accused was threatened, tricked or cajoled into a
waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily
waive his privilege. "2°2 Notice that the Court said any evidence of
the forbidden tactics will invalidate the waiver. Presumably this
means any credible evidence, but it need not satisfy any other evi-
dentiary standard. Thus, if the person confesses only after the police
state that if he cooperated it would go easier on him, and if he did
not, he would go to jail, there would be a finding of involuntary
waiver.201 In fact, any physical violence, threats, psychological pres-
sure or coercion, promises, inducements, artifice, deception, or fraud
196 Id. at 476 (emphasis added).
197Id. at 475.
198 See Davis v. State, 204 So. 2d 490, 495 (Ala. 1967).
199 This is the interpretation of the Denver Police Department. One defendant has been
given as many as eight advisements during the course of the investigation. But see
State v. Jones, 198 Kan. 30, 35, 422 P.2d 888, 892 (1967) (dictum).
2
00 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966).
201 However, detention simpliciter may be an independent violation of the McNabb-
Mallory rule. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Mallory v. United
States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957). See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a).
202 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966) (emphasis added). Notice the use
of the words, "any evidence." Presumably the Court is referring to any "credible"
evidence.
203 See United States v. Low, 257 F. Supp. 606 (W.D. Pa. 1966) ; cf. State v. LaFernier,
155 N.W.2d 93, 99 (Wis. 1967).
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on the part of the interrogators will invalidate a subsequent waiver.
The concern of the Court is to insure that a knowing and intelligent
waiver can be made in an environment that will permit and honor
nonwaiver.
E. Successive Interrogations: The Westover Situation.
A special waiver problem may be presented when the defendant
is subjected to interrogation on more than one occasion. This will
occur if the accused does not receive the advisement and execute a
waiver before the first interrogation, but is interrogated a second
time only after apparent compliance with Miranda. The question is
whether the waiver preceding the second interrogation is valid, in
view of the prior illegal police conduct.
This was the situation presented in Westover v. United States,2 °4
decided with Miranda. The defendant had been arrested by local
authorities who questioned him for several hours, although the de-
fendant made no confession. After having been in custody for four-
teen hours, the defendant was then interrogated by special agents
of the FBI about his involvement in other offenses. Two hours
later, the defendant confessed. Both interrogations were conducted
in the same police station, and defendant was apprised of his rights
only once, that being just prior to the second interrogation.
In holding the confession inadmissible, the Court said that al-
though the interrogations were conducted by two distinct law en-
forcement agencies and different crimes were involved, the impact
on the defendant was that of a continuous period of interrogation." 5
The defendant was precluded from making an intelligent waiver
because the advisement occurred only after intensive questioning;
thus, the federal authorities would have been the "beneficiaries" of
the earlier, illegal questioning. The Court was not without advice
for law enforcement officials:
A different case would be presented if an accused were taken into
custody by the second authority, removed both in time and place
from his original surroundings, and then adequately advised of his
rights and given an opportunity to exercise them. 206
After Westover, this much is certain: it is irrelevant that the
crimes involved are different; there need be no confession given at
the first interrogation; prior to the second interrogation, the de-
fendant should be removed both in time and place from his original
surroundings. It is apparent that procedurally, the issue falls under
the heading of "waiver." Thus, on the issue of waiver, the timeli-
204 384 U.S. 436, 494 (1966).
205 Id. at 496. As one court said, the belated waiving was "window dressing" to a great
extent. United States v. McCann, I BNA CRIM. L. REP. 2263 (N.D.N.Y. 1967).
206 384 U.S. at 496.
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ness of the advisement may be as important as the administering of
the advisement itself.
207
Although Westover involved interrogation by two distinct law
enforcement agencies, it seems clear that the Westover rationale
would apply in a situation where a series of interrogations is con-
ducted by the same authority.2 8 However, a valid waiver would be
more difficult to obtain because the defendant could probably not
be entirely removed from his "original surroundings. ' 20 9 In one case,
a second confession, after proper advisement and obtaining a waiver,
was excluded even though three days had elapsed and the scene of
the interrogation was changed from a schoolhouse to the police
station.
2 10
If a confession is made prior to the second confrontation, a
subsequent waiver will be more difficult to prove.2  In such a situa-
tion, the second confession would clearly be the "fruits" of the
first.212 Simply removing the person in time and place may not be
sufficient. The Supreme Court, in United States v. Bayer,218 has said:
Of course, after an accused has once let the cat out of the bag, by
confessing, no matter what the inducement, he is never thereafter
free of the psychological and practical disadvantages of having
confessed. He can never get the cat back in the bag. The secret is out
for good. In such a sense, a later confession always may be looked
upon as fruit of the first.214
Nevertheless, the Court in Bayer held a second confession admis-
sible, because it was given six months after the first, and was "volun-
tary" in the traditional sense.211 In a later case, 216 however, the
Court held a second confession inadmissible, because the relation
of the confessions was "so close that one must say the facts of one
control the character of the other.
2 17
Illustrative of this situation is an incident observed while riding
patrol with the Denver police. A man was arrested in a bar for
carrying a concealed weapon. Before being taken to the station,
and prior to being advised of his rights, he was subjected to interro-
207 See Tucker v. United States, 375 F.2d 363, 366 (8th Cir. 1967).
208See In re Knox, 53 Misc. 2d 889, 280 N.Y.S.2d 65 (Fam. Ct. 1967).
209 His interrogators may be different but they would represent the same authority.
Also, the interrogation will probably have been conducted within the same building,
if not in the identical room.
21
0 In re Knox, 53 Misc. 2d 889, 280 N.Y.S.2d 65 (Fam. Ct. 1967).
211 Evans v. United States, 375 F.2d 355, 361 (8th Cir. 1967).
212 Cf. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
213 331 U.S. 532 (1947).
2 14 Id. at 540.
215 Id. at 541.
216 Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954).




gation in the squad car. After several inculpatory admissions were
elicited, the man was taken to the police station. Before being
booked, he repeated his confession, after being advised of his rights
and signing a written waiver. Clearly, neither confession will be
admissible in court for the second was tainted and infected by the
poison of the first confession.218
Another way of expressing the applicable principle is that the
second confession is inadmissible unless the prosecution can prove
that the causative link between the two confessions had been severed.
It is suggested that this may be accomplished by removing the de-
fendant as far from the time and place of his original surroundings
as is reasonably possible 219 and, after advising the person of his
rights, telling him: "Nothing that you may have said or confessed
to prior to this time to any law enforcement official may be used
against you in any way unless they first told you of your right to
remain silent and to talk to an attorney and have him present dur-
ing questioning, and you then agreed to talk to them. Do you under-
stand?" If the person thereafter executes a waiver, subsequent state-
ments should be admissible. 2
F. Burden of Proof.
The burden of proving a waiver rests with the prosecution. 2'
The Court justifies this by saying that interrogations are usually con-
ducted in isolation and the state has the only means of making avail-
able corroborated evidence. If the defendant has no attorney present
during the interrogation, the government bears the "heavy burden"
of showing that he knowingly and intelligently waived his rights.222
It is thus obvious that there is no presumption of waiver; in fact,
a presumption of nonwaiver may be raised in favor of the accused.
It is not clear what quantum of proof is necessary to enable
the government to fulfill its "heavy burden." Most courts speak in
218 See Evans v. United States, 375 F.2d 355, 361 (8th Cir. 1967). But see Babson v.
State, 201 So, 2d 796 (Fla. 1967).
219 Space limitations may prove insurmountable. The police may also be unaware of
the existence of a prior, illegal interrogation. This will be particularly true in the
larger cities, because the interrogators may be different-the first being the arresting
officer and the second, a detective. In smaller communities, the arresting officer
usually follows the case through to the end.
220 Chief Jamerson of the Denver Police Department categorically states that after an
illegal confession has been obtained, there is nothing he can do that would permit
a subsequent confession to be admitted into evidence. Thus, he feels the taint of the
first confession is perpetually present. Interviw with Lloyd Jamerson, Division Chief,
Detective Division, Denver Police Department, in Denver, Colorado, Sept. 5, 1967.
221 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
222 Id. This would necessarily include the burden of proving that the advisement was
in fact administered and understood. See State v, Travis, 49 N.J. 428, 431, 231 A.2d
205, 207 (1967). See generally Warden, Miranda -Some History, Some Observa-
tions, and Some Questions, 20 VAND. L. REV. 39, 53-55 (1966).
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terms of "beyond a reasonable doubt '2 23 or "unmistakable clarity. ' 2 4
Whether these are expressions of a constitutional requirement or
merely the court's preference is not certain. Until the Supreme Court
clarifies its position, it is safe to assume only that the burden is
greater than "by a preponderance," the criterion for civil cases. If
an attorney is present, presumably the government would still have
the burden of proof, but it would be measured by more lenient
standards because the knowledge of the circumstances surrounding
the interrogation would be shared by the attorney.22 5 The burden
may also be lessened when the purported waiver took place in the
field, as opposed to the station house. 226 This is because the station
house is a more controlled environment, offering the police more
evidentiary techniques than in the more spontaneous situations oc-
curring on the street. On the other hand, an initial unwillingness to
talk may increase the burden of proving a subsequent waiver.22
The prosecution's heavy burden may necessitate proof other
than the oral testimony of the officer in charge of the interrogation.
Otherwise, a "swearing contest" may result between the officer and
the defendant, forcing the judge to determine the credibility of each.
This may not be the type of substantial proof Miranda dictates.2 8
Therefore, other techniques of proof will have to utilized. 229 Per-
haps the most common technique is the use of a printed advisement
form, setting forth the defendant's rights and a formal waiver. Both
the defendant and a witness would then sign it. The police could
also utilize tape recorders, video tapes and motion pictures. The
interrogation session could also be transcribed by a reporter or
stenographer. However, the cost of some of these devices may be
prohibitive, particularly for the smaller police departments.
No matter what techniques are utilized, the proof will never
be conclusive. Although they all pinpoint an occurrence at a cer-
tain time, none will reveal the events taking place prior to the alleged
223 See People v. Golwitzer, 52 Misc. 2d 925, 277 N.Y.S.2d 209 (Sup. Ct. 1966);
People v. Keesler, 53 Misc. 2d 268, 270-71, 278 N.Y.S. 2d 423, 426 (Allegany
County Ct. 1967); People v. Johnson, 50 Misc. 2d 1009, 271 N.Y.S.2d 814
(Nassau County Ct. 1966).
224 Evans v. United States, 375 F.2d 355, 360 (8th Cir. 1967).
=For a good discussion of burden of proof, see State v. Yough, 49 N.J. 587, 596-601,
231 A.2d 598, 603-05 (1967).
228 See Kamisar, A Dissent From the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New"
Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L. REv. 59, 61
(1966).
227 See People v. Fioritto, 64 Cal. Rptr. 797, 800 (Ct. App. 1967).
228 However, the State may be aided by the greater credence given the officer's
testimony by the court. See Elsen and Rosett, Protections for the Suspect Under
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waiver. They also may not show a subsequent retraction of waiver.
To allay any thoughts of police abuses would require a video tape
of the defendant from the time he was apprehended to when he
confessed. Even then, the tape may have been edited. However, in
the absence of proof by the defendant of circumstances apart from
the prosecution's evidence, a waiver will be provable with less than
a complete accounting of the time gap.
CONCLUSION
Although the preceding discussion has focused on some of the
potential legal limitations on Miranda, practical limitations may in
the final analysis be equally as significant in determining the scope
and effect of Miranda. Thus, some concluding comment on a few
practical limitations is justifiable.
The remedy provided in Miranda (i.e., exclusion of evidence)
becomes significant to the defendant only if he is prosecuted and
then only if the evidence is proffered against him. Thus, a person
aggrieved by unlawful police practices has no effective remedy un-
less the "ifs" are present. Even if a man is tried in court, the prose-
cution often has other sufficient evidence for a conviction and need
not utilize his confession. Thus, a wrong may have been committed
although the defendant has no remedy.
Miranda's potential effect is largely dependent on the impor-
tance of confessions to successful prosecution. There are undoubtedly
instances where the presence or absence of a confession is determina-
tive because of the lack of tangible evidence from other sources, but
there are differing opinions on the frequency of this type of situation.
Undoubtedly, Miranda will cause some shift from reliance on con-
fessions to more intensive field investigations and use of science and
technology in detecting and solving crimes. It is only in those in-
stances that the increased field investigation is unproductive that
Miranda can have any effect on the clearance rate. Of course,
Miranda may have more effect in smaller communities where addi-
tional funds to support a more complete scientific investigation are
probably unattainable. Even in larger cities, the latest scientific
equipment is often either in short supply or is nonexistent because
the police department's budget does not afford such a "luxury."
This prompts the final point of this Note: due process costs
money. Every decision of the Supreme Court that expands upon or
clarifies individual rights necessitates modifications in police or
court procedures which almost invariably involve a greater financial
burden for the courts and police to operate effectively under the new
decision. Several aspects of Miranda involve potentially greater
monetary burdens: assistance of state-provided counsel for the in-
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digent at an earlier stage in the prosecution; more sophisticated evi-
dentiary techniques to preserve proof of an advisement and waiver;
a greater portion of the officer's time to prepare the necessary docu-
ments and reports; more and better scientific equipment, technicians
and trained investigators. If additional money is forthcoming, the
individual may be able to enjoy the rights conferred under a liberal
or expansive interpretation of Miranda. However, without the neces-
sary money, both the courts and police may give Miranda a more
restrictive and narrow interpretation. This would impose severe
limitations on the rights of the individual. Miranda might, for
example, be limited to cases involving felonies, excluding all mis-
demeanors, not to mention traffic offenses. The definition of cus-
tody or effective detention may be severely restricted, perhaps lim-
ited to police station interrogations or those conducted in other
"police-dominated" atmospheres. The strict burden of proof of an
advisement and waiver may be relaxed. These and many other legal
issues may have their resolutions affected by the failure to properly
equip the law enforcement agencies and the courts to meet the
responsibilities thrust upon them by the Constitution, as interpreted
by the Supreme Court.
Ronald J. Miller
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